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LORD LYTTON
AND

THE A F G H A N WAR.

THE importance of England's mission in the East can hardly be
exaggerated, nor the results dependent upon its right appreciation by British Statesmen. Those Statesmen are responsible to
the British people, who themselves ultimately share the responsibility, if they sanction the acts of their representatives. We
have entered upon a war, the political consequences of which no
one can foresee; but it will most probably entail a great loss of
life, and certainly a large expenditure of money. In this crisis
any individual, however humble, who, like the writer of this
pamphlet, has been employed on the scene of action in former
days, and has filled official situations which have given him the
opportunity of studying the question, may be pardoned if he venture to place before his countrymen the conclusions at which he
has arrived. If he can contribute in the slightest degree to the
formation of a sound public opinion, if he can enforce caution, or
correct error, his object will be attained. He has no party purpose
in view. The honour, the justice, the interests of England, and
the welfare and prosperity of India, are too dear to him to allow
of his descending into the arena of party strife. H e feels assured
that the majority of thoughtful Englishmen only desire to have
A

-

brought before them the real facts of the case, to throw their
influence into what they believe to be the right cmse. But they
must have the whole case, and all the documents necessary to
enable them to form an impartial judgment upon it, and not a
mere statement of the case on one side. Has the whole casehave all the requisite documents-been laid before the public ?
No unprejudiced person can answer these questions in the affirmative. I s it not a fact that authentic and official documents were
long withheld, while one-sided statements and memoranda by
men holding high positions under the Government, and therefore
supposed to have access to the best means of information, were
put forward from time to time to bias the public mind ? Have not
inspired telegrams, containing exciting intelligence calculated to
arouse public indignation, been transmitted from India only to be
diluted or explained away shortly afterwards ? W e were told, for
instance, that the letter of Sher AX,the full text of which was
conveyed ill the Viceroy's telegram of the 19th of October, but not
published until recently, was of an insolent and defiant nature.
W h y was it not given to the public at once, so as to enable
competent persons to judge for themselves whether the interpretation put upon it by Lord Lytton was borne out by its tone and
language, and why were not the letters from our officers to his
officials to which Sller Ali referred also given? Witllout these
letters of which he complained no fair judgment could be come to
as to the provocation which led to the Amir's conduct. W e have
Eher Ali's letter now at page 252 of the "Afghanistan Papers,"
and it is characterized by Lord Lytton as " intentionally rude,
collreying a direct challenge, and that any demand for an apology
mould only expose US to fresh insult." I n order to form a correct
opinion upon it, in common justice to the Amir, the Persian text
ought to be submitted to ripe Oriental scholars, of whom there
are several in the Council of India. But taking the English
translation as it stands, few impartial persons will, it is believed,
support Lord Lytton's view ; and even the Ministers themselves,
by very properly directing that a further communication should
be forwarded to Sher Ali, would seem to have cast doubt on the
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Viceroy's hasty conclusion. W e have not before us, even now, all
the informati011which would enable the English people to form a
judgment as to the principles and policy which hwe plunged the
country into what many consider to be an unnecessary, impolitic,
and unjust war. Without having any voice on a question in
which their interests are so deeply concerned, the nation has been
compelled to take a tremendous leap in the darlr. The most
evils
complete success must be attended by all the horrors
which follow in the train of war. Only the clearest m d most
undoubted necessity could justify the recourse to that e&eme
arbitrament. Did that necessity exist ? and if it did exist vhere
is it going to lead the country? Will not our difficulties be
increased rather than diminished by the attainment of the ends
~roposedby the policy of the present Government? Shall me not
be in a worse position, both in a military and a political point of
view, even if the most entire success crown our efforts? These
are questions of paramount importance to the people of England,
requiring the utmost calmness and impartiality to come to a wise
and right decision. But can a calm and deliberate judgment be
hoped for, when some of the noblest of our citizens, and those
the best capable of giving advice, are denounced with bitterness
because they venture to resist the popular feeling, and strive to
instruct the public mind? Such efforts are not incompatible with
true patriotism; on the contrary, they have their origin in a
sacred jealousy of their country's honour and reputation, and in
a solemn sense of Christian duty.
But independently of the great principles of justice and
morality, which are involved in this question of the War in
Afghanistan, there are other questions of the highest inlportanoe,
in relation to the new mode of governing India, which it behoves
the English Parliament and people to look in the face, and at
the proper time to exact a full explanation. Every day more
and more
disclosures are made of information withheld,
of constitutional forms infringed and disregarded, and of a
system of personal government inaugurated in the highest degree
dangerous to our Indian Empire. We have the letters of those

eminent Indian functionaries, Sir Arthur Hobhouse and Sir
Henry Norman.
W e have the suppressed minutes of Sir
William Muir, replete with sound sense and ripe experience of
our Inclian administration.
What does Sir Arthur Hobhouse write?"Whether the mode of conclucting Inclian affairs during Lord
Salisbury's tenure of office has been in accordance with law, with
previous practice, or with public policy, is a question fraught, au I think,
with interest and importance to ihe nation, but quite apart from
personalities."

What food for reflection, what cause for anxiety, does not
this pregnant sentence (emanating from one who has held with
distinction the highest legal office in India) suggest to the minds
of those conversant with Indian affairs.
John Mill said truly :iLThegreat constitutional security for the good government of India
lies in the forms of business." " The Minister, placed in office by t h e
action of political party, except in very rare cases, can possess little or
no knowledgo of India."

The Viceroy, selected from similar party considerations, is,
generally, equally inexperienced in Indian affairs. Both are
assisted by Councils composed of eminent men, who have filled
the highest offices in India, and bring to their work a thorough
knowledge of alI branches of Indian administration and of t h e
peculiar usages, feelings) and prejudices of the people of India.
English Statesmen of large minds, and comprehensive European
experience, collect the opinions of their distinguished Councillors,
weigh them well, and come to their own conclusions. This has
d
hitherto been the practice of the greatest Indian Viceroys, a ~ of
the ablest Secretaries of State for India. Where differences of
opinion have existed, the dissentients in the Councils have had
the opportunity of recording their views, and in this manner both
sides of the various important questions which constantly arise
in the government of India have been placed before Parliament
and the country. Even the bitterest opponents of the East
India Company dmays admitted its excellence as a Government
of record.
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It appears that this salutary check on hasty and inconsiderate
action has been lately set aside, or at all events greatly curtailed,
both at home and abroad, and the evil results are already too
apparent. Lord Salisbury testifies, in the House of Lords, that
" in industry, caution, and sound hard discretion Lord Lytton has
not been exceeded by any Viceroy, who preceded him." Gibbon
writes:--"
Abu Rafe, servant of Mahomet, testifies to the wielding,
as a buckler, by Ali of the ponderous gate of a fortress, which he
and seven other men could not lift." Gibbon adds :-(' Abu Rafe
was an eye-witness, but who will be witness for Abu Rafe?)'
After a perusal of the ((AfghanistanCorrespondence," especially of
the conversations of the Viceroy with Nuwab Atta Mahomed
Khan, it will require more than Lord Salisbury's testimony to
convince the thinking portion of the English people of the
" caution and sound hard discretion of Lord Lytton,"
811 sorts of doctrines have been put forward by the Press, and by
the writers who support the Imperial policy of the present Government, in reference to our relations with the Bmir of Cabul, and,
by implication, with the Native States of India. Some of theso
doctrines, enunciated by men of great intellectual power, appear to
be so erroneous, and so opposed to the principles whioh have
hitherto generally guided the policy of the British Government,
that it behoves every man who has been connected with the
administration of India, and who holds strong opinions of their
dangerous tendency, to protest against their promulgation and
adoption. p" Amongst erroneous assumptionsit has been persistently
f i r m e d that the Amir of Cabul has no claim to independence,
because his father Dost Mahomed and he himself have received
subsidies fkom the Indian Government. Has England never subsidized European 8tates ? What of Prussia and Podugal ?
Frederick of Prussia, in the seven years' war, through our subsidies
kept the French armies employed near their own frontier, and
thus enabled England to maintain her superiority in India and in
America. Lord Chatham hunself said :-" I have conquered
America in Germany." Portugal preserved her very existence
by the i d of the subsidies of England, but neither Prussia nor

.#

Portugal on that account ceased to be regarded as independent
Parers. There is, howeyer, an illustration nearer at hand to Cabul.
Tlie Shah of Persia, through a long series of years, received subsidies from the Indian Goreri~ment,but no one ever maintained
4
that Persia therefore forfeited her independence.
Sir Jamcs Stcl~l~en,
in his discussion of the Afghan question,
has laid do~j-nprinciples ~f-llich
would seem to override the rights
of wery Bsi:itic State, and plncc them entirely at the mercy and
discr~tir~~l
of the British Goyernrne~lt. Our relations with these
stntc.;," he n-rites, "must be determined by the fact that we are
~ x ~ ~ c e d i po~verf~il
1 1 ~ 1 ~ and higllly civilized, and that they are
o~mpamtirclg\i~eak, and 11aX bbarbwous." ' But it will be
better to quote the nhole passage, which is couched in a tone
of national self-assertion calculated to wound the feelings and
cscite the rcscntme~ltof all Native Princes and Asiatic Rulers,
whether within our own territories or in countries adjacent to
them.
If an Englishman, on perusal of these paragraphs, feels his
blood tingle and his pulse beat high with indignation at such
I
despofic doctrines, what must be the feehgs of Princes like Sindia
and Holknr, or of such edi6htened Statesmep as Sir Salar Jung
and Sir AIndara Rao, or of "he Amir of Cabul, who look at such
questions from quite a different point of view, and take their stand
upon the obligations of treaties and the broad rules of morality
and justice, which are as applicable to the weak as to the strong ?
These rules, as John Mill says, " are as binding on communities
as on individuals ; and men are not warranted in doing to other
countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they
I
would not be jusaed in doing to other men for their own benefit."
Sir James Stephen writes :d

"I do not admit that England, Russia, China, the Amir of Cabul, the
Khan of Khelrtt, the Akhoond of Swat, the Nono of Spiti, and the Khan
of Khiva, form an assemblage of practically equal moral persons, whose
relations are to be discovered by consulting Grotius and his successors.
Fictions cannot be stretched beyond a certain point. England, Russia,
and China may treat on equal terms, but the other Rulers whom I have
mentioned are simply the chief Rulers of clans, more or less extensive and
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powerful, who, though not dependent upon us in the sense of any definite duties or allegiance t o the Queen, must be dealt with on the unclesstanding t h a t they occupy a distinctly inferior position-their inferiority
consisting mainly in this, t h a t they are not to be permitted to follow a
course of policy which exposes us to danger. This is the footing on
which every State enclosed i n the British dominions is practically
treated. It appears to me t h a t it is the only principle on which the
adjacent Powers can be treated. Our relt~tionswith Sindia, are, of course,
different from our relations with the Al~lirof Cabul, as they are different
from our relations with Holkar and the Nizmn; but, a t bottom, our relations with all ofthem stand on the same basis. They are all deterruined
by the a c t that we are excaerlillgly poiirerfnl and higl~lycivilized, and
that tlloy are cornp:tratively weak and llnlf barb~rous.'"

It is very convenient for this sort of argument to lump
together powerful nations and insignificant ststates, and to drag in
personages whose names, perhaps even in India, are not known to
one man in a thousand unless specially connected with them.
Who, until lately, except officers employed on the North-West
frontier, or those whose official duty it is to supervise Indian
affairs, could give you authentic information as to the power and
position of the Akhoond of Swat ?
And mho is the Nono of Spiti ? The very mention of such
a potentate seems to throw a shade of ridicule over a very grave
question. It was a source of amusement to frontier officers a few
years ago, when the Supreme Government penned a despatch,
intimating to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the
penal code was to be introduced into the territories of the Nono
of Spiti. The Lieutenant-G overnor had a sketch made of this
redoubtable potentate in his primitive costume, of a single cloth
round his loins (commonly termed a langoti), with his plough
on his shoulders, and his two little daughters carrying the seed,
on their way to their agricultural labours. his sketch he sent
into Government, and nothing more was heard of the introduction
of the penal code. To place this head man of a wild valley in
the Himalaya mountains, with an income of probably not more
than three pounds a month, in the same categoiy as the Amir
of Cabul, requires great confidence in the ignorance of those to
whom the argument was addressed.
Mr. Elphinstone mites that the Afghans appear to have been

entirely independent until the beginning of the seventeenth
century. They then paid tribute to Persia; but at the commencement of the eighteenth century they conquered Persia, and
established a short-lived Afghan dynasty, which was overthrown
by Nadir Shah. I n 1747, ten years before Clive won the battle
of Plassey, Ahmed Shah Abdallee was crowned King of Cabul.
Half-a-century later, one of the first political questions with
which Lord Wellesley 'had to grapple, on his arrival at Calcutta,
was the advisability of forming a defensive alliance between all
the existing Powers of Hindostan, to resist an expected invasion
of India by Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul.
On the 17th of June, 1809, the British Government concluded a treaty of alliance and co-operation with Shah Shuja.
Then came the ill-omened tripartite treaty between Shah Shuja,
Runjeet Sing, and the British Government, dated 20th July, 1838.
i
On the 30th March, 1855, another treaty was made with the
Amir, Dost Mahomed, on terms of perfect equality. There was
no infringement of his independence, no implied underst anding
that he occupied a " distinctly inferior position," or the British
officers entrusted with the negotiations might have found greater
difficulty in bringing them to a favourable conclusion. Have we
treaties of this nature with the Akhoond of Swat or with the
Nono of Spiti ? The principles put forward by Sir James Stephen
are full of danger, and tend to destroy confidence in the good
faith and fair dealing of the British 'Government. They would
not have been tolerated in the days of the East India Company,
and they would have found no favour in the eyes of the great
Statesmen like Malcolm, Munro, and Elphinstone, who illustrated
the Oompany3srule. It is not too much to say that those ~ t i t e s men never could have won their diplomatic triumphs in their
dealings with Native States if such principles had guided their
conduct. A distinguished member of the Council of India, Sir
Erskine Perry, possessing a knowledge of Indian affairs, and, it
may be added, of European politics, surpassed by few, thus records his protest against these principles :'L
I will only say, as a jurist, that I have been shocked at the doctrine
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lately put forth by high legal authority, that the main principles of international law are not applicable to the East. Those principles are
founded on large views of morality and justice, and if it is forbidden to
a civilized Power in Europe to use poisoned weapons, to shell defenceless
towns, to massacre or enslave prisoners, to invade a weak State because
t h e possession of it would be convenient to the captor-according to my
judgment these proceedings are equally forbidden to a civilized Power
i n Asia."

This doctrine of the unlimited attributes of the British
Government, as the paramount Power of India, t o deal as it
chooses not only with every Native State enclosed within its
dominions, but also " with adjacent Powers," to be, in fact, sole
judge in its own cause when disputed questions arise, which are
t o be decided according to its own interests," was, soon after its
promulgation, justly repudiated by Lord Northbroolr, whose administrative ability, prudent, well-balanced mind, and long official
training in the study and supervision of Indian affairs, pointed
him out as one peculiarly fitted to preside over our Indian
Empire. It is right to observe that Sir James Stephen subsequently explained and considerably modified the language of his
first letter, and, to show his feelings about justice, quoted from a
speech made by him in Calcutta, in which he says :bL I believe that the real foundation on which the British power in
this country stands, is neither military force alone, as some persons
cynically assert (though certainly military force is one indispensable
condition of our power) ; nor even that affectionate sympathy of the
native population, on vhich, according t o a more amiable, though not,
I think, a truer view of the matter, some think our rule ought to rest
(though it is hardly possible to overrate the value of such sympathy,
where it can by any meails be obtained). I believe that the real foundation of our power will be found to be an inflexible adherence to broad
principles of justice, common to all persons, in all countries, and all
ages, and enforced with unflinching firmness in favour of and against
evcry one who claims thoir benefit, or who presumes to violate them, no
matter who he may be.''

Sir

It is not intended to impute to Sir James Stephen any in-
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difference to justice. But his original statement conveyed t o
such acute and practised minds as those of Lord Grey and of Lord
Northbrook (and therefore, it may be supposed, to many European
and .Asiatic minds) a meaning utterly repugnant to that affec-

ino

tionate sympathy," to vhich he justly attaches so much value,
and seamed to be a defence of high-handed principles of despotism,
put forward for the sake of justifying our invasion of Afghanistan.
The very fact of explanation being required demonstrates the
necessity of caution, on the part of those capable of influencing
the public mind. Opinions thus hastily given, which are liable to
misconstruction, may lay the foundation of distrust and disaffection
in the minds of the Chiefs and Princes of India. Even now the
sting remains, and the doctrine is laid down, that with regard to
the Native States of India, and to the adjacent Powers, no law
nor rule exists to regulate the relations between them and the
British Government but that which the British Government may,
to the best of their judgment, deem most conducive to the happiness and lasting peace of Lits subjects and its neighbours, the
grounds for this Imperial doctrine being that "none of them is
strong enough or civilized enougl~to be really or permanently
independent."
This is no new doctrine. I n the days of annexation i t was
propounded, time after time, by those who supported the policy of
absorbing the Native States, and bringing all Hindostan under
British rule.. But even Lord Dalhousie himself, whose Imperial
proclivities were unmistakeable, in his minute of the 27th May,
1851, on the affairs of the Nizam, recorded his strong opinion in
reprobation of so dangerous a doctrine. H e writes :-

" I recognize no mission confided t o the Brit,ish Government which
imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right, of
deciding authoritatively on the existence of native independent Sovereignties, and of arbitrarily setting them aeide, vhenever their sdministration may not accord with its own views, and although their act,s in no
way affect the interests or security of itself or its allies. Still less can
I recognize any such property i n the acknowledged supremacy of the
British Government in India, as can justit'y its rulers in disregarding
the positive obligations of international contract,^, in order to obtrude
on Native Princes and their people a system of subversive interference,
which is unwelconle alike to people and to Prince." :
It has been well observed that "the eternal principles of
right and wrong should influence us in dl parts of the world."
The acts of England are not done in a corner. The eyes of all
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nations are upon her. The millions of India are as sensitive to
the infringement of the unalterable laws of justice as the more
enlightened communities of Europe. Not only in Europe and in
Asin, but even in Africa, deeds which redound to the creclit or
discredit of the British nation are discussed. Shortly after the
unjust annexatioll of Sinde, Dr. Richardson, a traveller in Central
Africa, relates the following circumstance :-

" Tlie conversntion was stopped by the entrance of a reinarlrable
personage, the quasi Sultan of Ben Walid. Having heard that I was
present, he said : ' Cllristian, do you lrnow Sinde? ' ' Yes,' I said. He
then tlurnecl and said something to the people in the Gliadarliai
language. I afterwards learned it was, ' You see these Christians are
eating up all the S/lussalman countries.' He then abruptly turuecl to me,
Why do the English go there, and eat up all the Mussulmans?
afterwards you will come here.' I replied, ' Tlle A~nirswere foolish,
and engaged in conspiracy against the E n g l i ~ hin India, but the Mussulmans in Sinde enjoyed the same privileges as the Ei~glishthemselves.'
That is what you say,' he rejoined ; and then continued, 'Why do you
go so far from home to take other people's countries from them?' I
replied, ' The Turks do the same : they collie to the desert.' ' Ay, you
wish to be such oppressors as the Turlcs.' He then told me not to talk
any more, and a painful silence continued for some time?'
But if bad deeds make their mark for evil, and cast discredit
on the British name, good deeds exercise a sovereign influence
for good, and pave the way for the blessings of civilization and
Christianity in a manner little imagined by superficia.1 observers
of the course of events. The wisdom of British Statesmen, the
heroism of British soldiers, the self-devotion of British missionaries, have all, under God, contributed to build up our magnificent
Empire in the East. The moral force of individual character
exercises unbounded sway over impulsive, half-civilized Asiatics.
The line of demarct~tion is broken. down between races,
antagonism subsides, prejudices melt away, and it may be said of
these beriofactors of mankind, "Fragrance on their footing treads,"
and their good deeds live after them. Outram won the hearts of
the Bheels ; Edwardes subjugated, without bloodshed, the wild
tribes of the valley of Bunnoo. I n the same manner the grandeur and simplicity of the character of Monntstuart Elphinstone
created, as a native author states, " a most wonderful and noble

reversion of respect for the generosity, truth, and justice of the
British nation in the minds of the Afghan Chiefs and people."
Those who conversed with Afghans, forty and fifty years ago,
can well remember the honour awarded to the name of 'cUlfi.ishteen," the traditions of whose splendid mission had been handed
down fiom father to son amongst these wild but impressionable
mountaineers.
Alas ! the more bitter memories of the unfortunate Cabul
expedition changed the currents of thought, and heaped
up a wealth of hatred and execration on the British name
in afghanistan, while " disasters, unparallelled in their extent,
unless by the errors in which they originated," seventeen
millions of treasure wasted, thousands of lives fruitlessly expended,
left traces 111 British recollections not to be wiped out even by
the brilliant victories which restored the 1.ustre of British arms.
A long interregnum ensued, during which Afghanistan remained a
sealed book to British influence, until, on the 30th March, 1855,
a treaty was concluded with Dost Mahomed by Sir John Lawrence, under the instructions of Lord Dalhousie. Subsequently,
in January 1857, in consequence of the war between England
and Persia, an agreement was entered into wlth Dost Mahomed,
by which he undertook to defend Heriit against Persia; and
for this purpose the British Government furnished him with
money and arms.
It was Lord Canning's desire that these negotiations should
be intrusted to Sir Herbert Edwardes, who, as Commissioner of
Pesha~vur,had taken a leading part in bringing about a reconciliation with the Afghans. Lord Lawrence, in whose character
magnanimity and self-abnegation are conspicuous, entertaining, as
he did, the affectioc of a brother for Sir Herbert, and placing the
highest value upon his ability and services, was quite willing to
give way, although the conduct of negotiations of such moment
naturally have devolved upon him, as Chief Commissioner
of the Punjab. But an unexpected obstacle arose to this arrangement. Dost Mahomed, with whom the name of John Lawrence
was as a household word, would treat with no one else, and
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refused to attend the meeting unless this was conceded. No doubt,
besides the feeling of personal regard, there mas the idea that
his dignity would be compromised if he met an officer of inferior grade. These negotiations were therefore carried out by
Lawrence and Edwardes, and the important consequences resulting
from them were patent to all the world during the eventful years
of the Sepoy mutiny, when a formidable inroad of Afghan hordes
might have added greatly to our difficulties. It mas at this
meeting that the following affecting incident occurred :-

" See these coarse garments, said Dost Mahomed, opening his vest,
how old and patched they are. Are these the proper robes for a ruling
Prince? This shawl around my head is the sole piece of finery I possess.
I have no money whatever. My sons and my Chiefs take everything I
have. They leave me nothing, and they tear me into pieces with their
dissensions. I live from hand to mouth among them, a life of expediente.
I wish to Heaven that I could turn Faqueer, and escape from this heavy
lot."

,

I
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Dost Mahomed remained our staunch friend until the day of
his death, on the 9th of June, 1863. He had made himself
master of Her6t by a vigorous attacl;, not altogether unaided by
the garrison, on the 27th of Nay. On the death of Dost
Mahomed, Sher Ali commenced to rule, having been nominated
heir-apparent some years before, on the demise of his brother,
Gholam Hyder; but from the very beginning of his reign he met
with determined opposition from a party headed by his elder
brothers, Mahommed Mzal Khan and Mahommed Azim Khan.
Then succeeded a revolutionary period in Afghanistan, lasting
about five years, on which it is not necessary to dwell.
The Government of India, in accordance with the settled
policy of the Government at home, kept aloof from any interference with Afghan internal affairs. Dost Mahomed himself
counselled this line of action. " If you wish," he said, to be
friends with the Afghans, beware of meddling with their intestine
quarrels." The object of the British Government was to leave
the choice of a Ruler to the Afghan nation; the probabilitywas that
the most popular, the most able, and the most powerful of the
Barukge Chiefs, the fittest for the position, mould gain the
ascendency. Ostensible British aid would not increase his popu(L

,

larity. It might contribute t o his temporary success, b u t it
could not maintain him upon the throne without a continuous
and exhausting drain of British resources, both of m e n and
money. Moreover the proverbial fickleness and faithlessness of
Afghan Chiefs would probably render him a broken reed very
likely to pierce the hand in the hour of need. Except where
their own interests are maf;erially concerned, all history and all
experience are against the notion that Afghan Rulers will ever
prove '' grateful and eficient allies." It must be recollected also
that many of the acts of Sher Ali, though quite in accordance
with the Afghan character, were not such as the British Government could approve. It was not a t all improbable that h e might
have so conducted himself as to have estranged the majority of
the Afghan Chiefs and people. I f me had espoused his cause
in the earlier part of the contest, we might have found ourselves
supporting a tyrannical Ruler against the wishes of the Mghan
nation. In 1868 Sher Ali finally established his authority in
Afghanistan. The Viceroyalty of Lord Lawrence was then
coming to an end; but one of his last acts before h e quitted India
was to enter into friendly relations with Sher Ali, by inviting
him to a Burbar, and by promising to aid him with money
and arms. The important letter of Lord Lawrence, of the
9th January, 1869, written on this occasion, shows the basis of
our subsequent diplomatic relations with Sher Ali. I' Lord
Lamrence writes :" I am leaving the country almost immediately, and am handing over
tho high office of Viceroy and Governor-General to m y successor. But
the policy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of
Afghanistan is one wliich I have entered on with anxious deliberation,
and wbich has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty
tho Queen of England, and as long as yo11 continue, by your actions, t o
evince a real desire fbr the alliance of the British Government, yon have
nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our interference in the internal affairs and admini~t~ration
of your

Syed Noor Mahorned; at the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly,
quotes passages from this letter,+ m d refers especially to Lord
Lawrence's knowledge of "the circumstances of Afghanistan."
"Its good and evil were clearly known to him." ' H e states
a
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"Our opinion," he says, " is the same as that from the time of the
l a t e Amir and Lord Lawrence to the time of the Ulnballit Durbar, and
till the arrival of the present Vicemy has always been mentioned in our
past correspondenca, and we are h m l y of those opinions now. Thcrefore 1 1 0 . ~can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the
performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show
b y many proofs ? "
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These hard conditions were the location of British officers in
a f g h a n territory, on which Lord Lytton peremptorily insisted.
I t was left t o Lord Mayo, who succeeded Lord Lav-rence on the
1 2 t h January, 1189, to carry out the arrangements with Sher
Ali. Hence the Umballa Durbar which took place in March
1869. Sher Ali preferred a great many requests with which
Lord Mayo did not think proper to comply. The object the Amir
had chiefly at heart was the recognition of his son Abdulla Jan
as his heir. To this the Viceroy would not listen, neither mould
he consent t o make a Treaty offensive and defensive, nor grant a
fixed subsidy ; but he promised that British officers should not be
stationed in Afghanistan, and on this point Sher Ali, like his
father before him, laid the greatest stress. Not, perhaps, that
he had personally so great an objection ; but he h e w well that
such a concession on his part mould do him harm in the eyes
of his ignorant and fanatical Chiefs and people. The pomer of
Afghan Rulers is never sufficiently stable to allow of their giving
a handle to insurrectionary movements, especially in the direction
of religious bigotry. Although disappointed in many respects,
there is no doubt Sher Ali returned to Cabul from the U m b d a
Durbar more friendly to the British Government than before.
Lord Mayo's princely courtesy and hank genial demeanour made
a deep impression on the Barukzye Chief, and produced the
happiest results. That this friendly feeling lasted wtil Lord
Mayo's death, the touching letter Sher Ali wrote on the occasion
of that mournful event sufficiently testifies. This letter was
addressed to the Acting Viceroy. In it Sher Ah writes :-

'' The unvarying

friendship and kindness displayed towarda me by

him who is now no more had induced me to determine, if the affairs of
Afghanistan c t t the time permitted the step, to accompany His Excellency on his return to England, so that I might have obtained the
gratification of a personal interview with Her Majesty the Queen, and
derive pleasure from travelling in the countries of Europe. Before the
eternally-predestined decrees, however, men must bow in silence."

No one can peruse this letter without the conviction that
sympathy and right feeling are not wanting in the Amir's
character, and that by wise forbearance and treatment he might
have been moulded to our own purposes, and our relations with
p'
him placed upon a satisfactory footing. The defenders of Lord
Lytton's policy have endeavoured to show that the estrangement
of Sher Ali dates from a period much earlier than the Umballa
Durbar. A certain feeling of resentment probably did at one
time exist in his mind, because the British Government had not
aided him Inhis contest for the throne. I t is clear, however, from
the tone of this letter, and from other evidence, that this feeling
had almost entirely disappeared, owing to the measures initiated
by Lord Lawrence, and carried out with such tact and judgment
by Lord Mayo. 'soon after the Umballa Durbar the mission of Sir
Douglas Porsyth to St. Petersburgh occurred, and a lengthened
diplomatic correspondence was commenced, mhich ended, during
the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, in the Russian Government
accepting the definition of the territory of Mghanistan, as proposed by the Government of India, by which arrangement Sher
Ali acquired a greater security with respect to the Northern
boundary of his dominions than he had ever before possessed. It
is desirable here to draw special attention to the wise step adopted
by Mr. Gladstone's Administration, at the suggestion of Lord
Lamence's Government, in initiating these friendly negotiations.
A frank interchange of the views of England and Russia on the
affairs of Central Asia and Afghanistan ensued, which resulted in
a distinct understanding that both Governments should exert
all their influence to introduce peace and order into these troubled
regions. The £ruits of this good understanding were manifant on
many occasions. W e read, in Sir John Strachey's minute, dated
30th April, 1872 :-
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" To Rutrsian influence in Bokliara was due the prompt
of a
party of Bokhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869.
To the restraining ]land kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in
Turkestan is t o be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to
shake the throne of the Amir. When the most formiclablo of those
refugees, Abdool Rllhman, once openly represeated that it would be for the
intelrnest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul, General
Von Ihufmann replied that hospitality had been afforded him on consideration of his destitute circumsta,nces, and not as an enorlly of England,
or a pretender to the throne of Cabul. General Von Ksufmann llimself,
in the spring of 1870, conlnlenced a direct correspondence, which bas
been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed to the Amir assurances
of tlie neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities
towards the Afghan Government."
On being informed by Sher Ali of the first communication
from General Kaufmann, Lord Mayo, on June 24th, 1870, wrote
back to the Amir":( L These letters will doubtless be, when rightly understood, a, source of
satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness.''

It does not appear from these extracts that the morbid dread
of Russian machinations, which has led Lord Salisbury and Lord
Lytton to depart from the wise policy of their predecessors, had
at that time any influence on the minds of those intrusted mith
the Gorernment of India.
Lord Mayo lost his valuable life, by the hand of a foul
assassin, on the 8th of February, 1872. Lord Northbroolr
succeeded him on the 3rd of May, 1872. The most important
incident connected with Afghanistan during the period of his
Viceroyalty was the dispatch to Simla, in 1873, by Sher Ali of
a Special Envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah.
Alarmed at the fall of Khiva, the Amfr sought more intimate
relations with the British Government, and desired to ascertain
how far he could rely on British aid in the event of his territories
being threatened by Russia. His demands hornever, in the first
instance, were so extravagant that it was impossible for Lord
Northbrook to comply with them, more especially as Sher AX was
unwilling that Afghanistan should be called upon to make any
return for the assistance rendered by the British Government.
I n fact, the Amir, professing to believe that our interests were as
B

much concerned or more so than his own, sought an conditional
guarantee of protection and very large payments of money for
the fortscation of his fiontier and the equipment of his army.
Lord Northbrook very properly objected to these requests,
which would have entailed unlimited responsidility and expenditme, without our being able to exercise any control over the
course the Amir might choose to pursue. But Lord Northbrook
mas quite willing to give a guarantee with reasonable conditions
attached to it, and ultimately he assured the Envoy that the
British Government, in the event of any actual or threatened
aggression, would assist the Amir "with arms and money, and
also, in case of necessity, with troops." A letter to this effect
was addressed by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, to which the
"Record of Conversations " with the Envoy was appended.
This record was a formal document officially communicated to
the Envoy, and signed by him, and in Lord Northbrook's opinion
was binding on the British Government. The Envoy doubting
how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to
any definite arrangement, it was considered desirable to postpone
the h a 1 settlement to a more favourable opportunity, when so
important R matter might be discussed with the Am'r in person.
That the A d r accepted this promise of assistance as a binding
engagement on the part of Lord Northbrook, in the same manner
as he accepted the letters and assurances of friendship and
support fiom Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, is abundantly
evident from the constant reference made to these assurances by
Syed Noor Mahorned, at his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly.*
The Envoy says :-" It is far from the melfare of States if there
should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by
such religious Governments, and such Ministers and Viceroys."
Again :-'' Therefore, I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two
Governments, that his Excellency the Viceroy, through your good
offices, d with great frankness and sincerity of purpose act in
conformity with the course of past Viceroys." And again, with
mournful earnestness, he says :-"Pour Government is a powerful
and a great one, ours is a small and weak one. We have long
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been on terms of friendship, and the Amir now clings to the skirt
of the British Government, and, till his hand be cut off, he mill
But Lord Lytton, with the giant
not relaz his hold of it."
strength of British power at his back) is determined to press his
obnoxious conditions, and is deaf to all other considerations.
He does not even shrink from dealing with the acts and promises
of his predecessors in a manner hitherto unknown in India, thus
inflicting a serious blow an the confidence of every Native Prince
in the assarances of Her Majesty's Representatives.
Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook had all
given solemn promises in writing to the Amir ; but, according to
Lord Lytton, these were c40nlyverbal understandings," as if
formal official letters and written engagements were of no account
unless embodied in definite treaties. ' Sir Lewis Pelly tells the
Envoy :-ccYour Excellency, however, appears to be under an impression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not
contracted under treaty, have been none the less incurred by the
British Government, through certain written and verbal assurances received by the Amir in 1869 &om Lord Mayo, and by
Etis Highness's Envoy from Lord Northbrook ; this impression
is entirely erroneous." It is of importance here to note that, in
Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 28 th February, 1876, this verbal
understanding of 1869 is spoken of as a "solemn and deliberate
declaration approved by Her Majesty's advisers ;" and it is admitted that, " to the Amir who had ;received that declaration under
circumstances of some solemnity and parade' it appears to have
conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favour." I n reference,
also, to the declaration of Lord Northbrook, in 1873, Lord Salisbury writes :-'< The terms of the declaration, however, although
sufficient to justify rel3roaches on the part of Sher Ali, if, in the
contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported
by the British Government, mere unfortunately too ambiguous to
secure confidence or inspire gatitude on the part of His Highness."
Lord Salisbury is pleased to characterize Lord Northbrook's declaration as c L ambiguous," but the a m i r himself did not so accept
it, as His Highness's Envoy repeatedly af6rmed. I t was left to

Lord Lytton, and to Sir Lewis Pelly under Lord Lytton's instructions, to repudiate the written engagements of previous Viceroys.
fiir John Malcolm's maxim, inculcated upon political officers in
the olden time, mas more generous and more worthy of the British
Government :-" When any article of an engagement is doubtful,
I think it should be invariably explained with more leaning to
the expectations originally raised in the weaker than to the interests of the stronger Power." It is dif3cult to conceive anything
more calculated to sow doubt and distrust in the minds of the
Envoy and of the Amir than this conduct of Lord Lytton. Lord
Northbrook has stated that "he endeavoured, to the best of his
ability, to carry out the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo,
not only because he thought it right to carry on a successive
policy, but because he entirely believed and concurred in that
policy, and &hereasons on vhich that policy was founded." In
the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly, the Cabul Envoy aiFrmed
that, from the time Lord Northbrook came to India to the time
he left, although there mere discussions on the subject, still he
left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct
of his predecessors, and with preceding usage.
Sir Henry Norman also writes :L'Myopinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's
departure the Amir had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was
somewhat out of temper and was disquieted by writings which more or
less pointed a t measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may
have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to
measures taken from April 1876 to the present time."

Lord Lytton succeeded to the Viceroyalty on the 12th of
April, l87G, and agitating rumours began immediately to be circulated at home and abroad as to important changes about to be
adopted in the policy that had hitherto been pursued on the
North-West frontier, and in the management of our relations
with the Amir of Cabul. Lord Lytton took to India Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 28th February, 1876, which prescribed a
line of policy entirely oppoeed to that which had been carried out
by previoua Biceroys under instructions fiom successive Administrations at home. That policy had been pressed upon Lord North-
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brook's Government, but weighty reasons had been given in
opposition to it, showing the e d s to which it would inevitably
lead. Lord Salisbury himself, it would appear, had his misgi~ings,as he writes that, ill case of "the irretrievable alienation
of the Amir, no time must be lost in re-considering, from a
new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to
Afghanistan."
*/' Lord Lytton, it is understood, kept this important deupatcb
t o himself for a considerable period without communicating its
contents to his Council. It will be observed that it is addressed
imply to the Governor-General of India, and not to the GovernorGeneral in Council. According t o law, the Government of India
is vested in the Governor-General in Council, and it is not legal,
nor has it hitherto been the practice, that the Governor-General
should be recognized apart from his Council. This is, probably,
one of the innovations alluded to by Sir Arthur Hobhouse, when
he draws attention to Lord Salisbury's new mode of governing
India. It may be further remarked, in reference to this despatch
of the 28th February, 1876, which Lord Lytton carried to India,
that, as far as can be discovered from the published correspondence,
no reply to it was sent home until the 10th May, 1877.
During this long interval, when successive steps were being
taken to inaugurate a complete change of policy, and when Parliament and the country were designedly kept in ignorance of the
course of action pursued, the Government of India must have been
carried on, as regards its foreign relations, in demi-official letters
exclianged between Lord Salisburg and the Viceroy. his system
of personal government may be in perfect accordance with the
peculiar idiosyncrasies of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton; but
the evils that are likely to flow from the exercise of unchecked
authority by Viceroys and Ministers, and from the absence of due
record and publicity, in such an important dependency as India,
are patent to all who have stuhed the history of their country.
John Mill writes :-

" The government of dependencies by a Minister and his subordinates, under the sole control of Parliament, is not a new experiment in

Englantl. That form of Cololliitl Government lost the United States, and
llnd nearly lost all the Colonies of any considerable population and
importnnce."
,"
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Our proceedings on the frontier began at this time to excite
interest in Europe, and various articles in the Continental Press
drew attention to our dealings with the Khan of Khelat, and the
apparently wider range of our general frontier policy. The fol~s
that, in these days of rapid
lowing extract from Le T e m ~ shovs
communication and spread of intelligence through '' our own correspondents," everything that takes place in India is made
subject uf comment, and its bearing upon European politics
weighed and discussed. La ~ i n y writes
s
:-

'' NOSlecteurs auront sans doute remarque dans les depgches d'l~ier
une nouvelle quc la dernibre lettre cle notre correspondant de 1'Inde faisait
prdvoir. Le gourernement Anglo-Indien vient de signer avec le Khan
de Kelate un traitd qui recule les frontikres n~ilitairesde 1'Inde-dnglaise
vers le- Mord Ouest, ou en d'autres terrnes les rapproche de celles du
Tur-Irestnu russe. La politique Indo-Anglaise rompt par cet acte
avec cies principes cju'elle professait depuis un assez grand nombre
d't~11116e~.
Elle s'dtuit prhoccupbe B plusieurs reprises dans ces derniers
teinps de divers projets da geu1.e de celui qui vient d'Btre adopt& et mis
S exdcution, mais une idhe prbvalrtit dans ses conseils, C'Btait que la
domination Britannique ne devait pas 2tre poussee au delh des limites
atteintes. La, politique opposCe qui prend aujourd'hui le dessus, politiquo
d'initiative, l' spirited policy " dieent les Anglais, n'aurait ni but, ni raison
dJ8tre, s'il ne fallait y voir 1s temoignnge d'une mbfiance en Bveil et le
programme 1u6rne de pricautions que l'bngleterre juge indispensables
pour d6jouer tl'avance les plans supposes de la Russie, sa voisine dans
1'Asie Centrale. L'envoi d'un Resident -4nglais i, Caboul pour surveiller 1'Emir itccusi! d'intriguer avec les Russes parait ddcid6. Ces
mesures qui sont iiiterpretdes Q Xoscow et B Saint Petersburg dans un
sens d6favorable n'ont pas l'approbation de tout le monde en bngleterre.
On fait valoir notanlment contre l'occupation armde de nouveaux
territoires, outre les considdrations d'icono~niedes raisons politiques et
militaires dent la nloins specieuse n'est pas que le meilleur moyen de
rendre service de son ennemi, c'est d'aller :i son rencontre, parceque cela
lui Qpargne I n moitid dn cbemin."
Had Lord Northbrook remained at the head of affairs in
India, his measures would have been understood to have been
directed solely to the settlement of the Khelat disputes, to the
protection of the commercial traffic through the Bolan Pass, and
to the pacification of the Belooch tribes in that vicinity. They
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mould neither have given rise to any distrust or appre
- - hcnsion on
the part of the Amir of Cabul nor mould they have afforded any
grounds for the belief, that we mere taking the first step to throw
domn the gauntlet to Russia, and were preparing for a further
advance, with a view to the rectification of our North-Western
/
frontier. But Lord Lytton made no secret of his ultimate intentions, nor of the Imperial scope of the ~olicvwhich he had
come out to India to inaugurate. afgllanistan must be brought
within British influence ; to this end British officers must be
stationed in Afghan cities, and to use his own words, "having
regard to probable contingencies in Central Asia," fiolltier afFairs
must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important
objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British
border ." j'
J'
Here we have a distinct change of policy enunciated, and the
object declared without reserve, that object being- the rectifying
- of the British frontier, to counteract the advance of fiussia in
Central Asia. This departure from a line of policy d i c h the
British Government had pursued for so many years was contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of our understanding with
the Russian Government, and as the writer in Le Temps says,
fbould have no possible aim or reason except as a countermove
and measure of precaution against the supposed designs of Russia. The Russian Government had several times assured England
that "Afghanistan was outside the sphere of Russian action." We
learn from Sir John Strachey's minute, and Lord Northbrook has
confirmed the statement, that Russia had shorn on many occasions that it had "no desire to depart &om its engagements in
that matter." Of course this compact could exist only on the
supposition that England and Russia continued on terms of amity,
and that England herself preserved her neutral attitude.
I When the discussions in Europe assumed a threatening aspect,
and native troops were brought from India, and when all sorts of
rumours were afloat in reference to the hostile intentions of England, Russia naturally felt absolved from her tacit understanding
We must look st these matters from a Russian as well as horn
J.

'
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an English point of view. Russia is as jealous and suspicious of
us as we are of her, and is as much entitled to take precautions
with regard to her possessions in Central Asia as we are with
regard to India. The warlike preparations of Lord Lytton on
the banks of the Indus, which alarmed the Amir of Cabul, were
currently reported to be preparatory to a movement, through
Afghanistan, upon the dominions of Russia in the countries
beyond the Oxua. What did General Skobeleff say to Oolonel
Brackenbury ?-

'' I cannot make out what has become of that column of ten thousand men, organized by your people t o raise Central Asia against us.."
As in Russia, so in England there is a class of people, gifted
with facile pens and fertile imaginations, who are constantly
employed in sounding the alarm, and prognosticating evil results
from the advance and progress of what they are pleased to term
rival nations. France, America, Russia, at different intervals, have
come under this category. These men, while loud in their profeasions of patriotism,'by fostering a spirit of antagonism, and pandering to national prejudices, are the worst enemies of their country,
the real substantial interests of which depend mainly on t h e
continuance of peace, and on the cultivation of friendly relations
with all the world. Every thoughtful Englishman must lament
the bitter state of feeling against Russia which pervades England
at the present moment, and all who estimate aright the dreadful
calamities a conflict would entail on both countries must desire to
remove any causes of misunderstanding which would tend to
precipitate such a catastrophe. There may not be any danger of
immediate collision, but the worst feature of our present policy i n
Europe and in Asia is that it enlarges the area of prospective
aaQtzgonism, and is pregnant with future mischief.
The real questions are, were the proceedings of Russia in
Central Asia, including the dispatch of General Stolietoff's
Mission to Cabul, ~ u c has to give England just cause of serious
complaint ? Have the explanations afforded by Russia been of
a character to satisfy tho British Government ? / w e have t h e
statement of the Prime Minister that, looking to the strained
w

~d suspicious of
tke precautions
ts we are with
iord Lytton on
of Cabul, were
jment, t h o u g h
the countries:
say to Colonel
m n of ten thouia against us."

I people, gifted
are constantly
ing evil results
)leased to term
intervals, have
in their profesm, and panderi their country,
nainly on t h e
endly relations
a must lament
vades England
~tthe dreadful
must desire to
vould tend to
any danger of
esent policy in
of prospective
of Russia in
a1 Stolietoff's
use of serious
:ussia been of
We have the
the strained
9

relations that existed between England and Russia at a certain not
very distant period, the expedition which Russia mas preparing
in Central Asia at that time, with which the Rfissicm to Cabul was
connected, was perfectly allowable. Lord Salisbury also is quite
contented to accept the explanations of M. de Giers, and takes
for panted that " all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity."
Russia is therefore entirely absolved, and Lord Beaconsfield
declares her conduct to have been "very satisfactory ;" but
he adds :L' After all that had occurred it was totally impossible for ua to leave
things as they were; you colxld not go on after you liad found Russian
armies almost in sight of Cabul, and an Embassy within its walls ; yon
could not go on on the 011 system. It was absolutely necessmy t o consider what course should be talcen." /"

It is to employ somewhat figurative language, to speak of
Russian armies almost in sight of Cabul," but it mas necessary to
make out a case of British interests in jeopardy. I t mas politic
to accept the explanations of Russia, but a danger had been
disclosed against which it was imperative t o provide. Whether
that danger was real or unreal, or whether, if real, it was best
met by the course adopted, are the points at issue. I n pursuanoe,
however, of his object, the obli~ationsof justice, of reciprocal
treaties, and of the rights of an independent nation to preserve its
freedom, which it had enjoyed for hundreds of years, were
apparently of small moment to Lord Beaconsfield. I n a similar
spirit Prince Bismarck, on the occasion of the annexation of
Hanover, declared "that to attend to like considerations mould
be to substitute the superficial for the essential, and that his
objects must be carried through by blood and iron. Upon those
who venture to remmstrate against such imperial doctrines, Lord
Beaconsfield strives to nffix the stigma " of peace at any price
advocacy," and backed by his present large majorities in both
Houses of Parliament, he is enabled to snatch a temporary
triumph ; but it remains to be seen whether, when the whole case
is before the country, this verdict will be confirmed.
((

*

Mr. Burt, the honest and able representative of tho working
classes in the House of Commons, stated :-

'' He hacl many ~pportunit~iesof ascertaining the feelirlgs of the
working classes, and he did not know a single man who believed that we
were right in this war. He had not met with any wol-king mall who did
not believe that we were engaged in an unjust and cewardly tvar."
The instincts of the working men of England, in favour of
justice and fair play, are as strong cmd as true as of many of those
who, by the accidents of outward position, exorcise a more
authoritative voice in determining the policy of the country. Lord
Canning, when he set his face like a flint against the ravenous
cry for blood, and earned, to his immortal honour, what was then
considered by the unthinldng many, the opprobrious epithet of
" Clemency Canning," lived to witness the revulsion in his favour ;
and .the illustrious names of Gladstone and of Lawrence, in common with hundreds of England's most distinguished citizens, can
afford to fling back with scorn the " peace at any price " stigma
sought to be cast upon them by Lord Beaconsfield. It may be
stated, once for an, that those who are the foremost in condemning
the injustice and impolicy of the present Afghan war, would be
the first, in the event of unprovoked aggression by Russia, or by
any other Power, to advocate the putting forth the wholo strcngth
and resources of England to avert any real danger from our Indian
Empire.
The conduct of Russia having been so very satisfactory,"
according to Lord Beaconsfield, where was the necessity of driving
Sher Ali into a corner, so that he could not but stand at bay, or lose
his influence with the ignorant and fanatical tribes over whom he
exercised a precarious sway ? Was the danger to India so pressing
and imminent that we were obliged to act "with breathless haste?"
to use Sher Ali's expression. We learn from Lord Northbrook
that when he left India, "though Sher Ali would havo dislilred any
interference on the part of England, he would have disliked any
shown on the part of Russia to a far greater extent." Sir IIcnrg
Norman confirms this statement. What induced Sher Ali's change
of feeling 2 It was owing to the various measures adopted by Lord
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Lytton, which, step by step, were inevitably leading up to the
present calamitous war. This mas foreseen by the most experienced members of Lord Lytton's Council, mhile those best
conversant with .Indian affairs at home watched the progress of
events with undisguised alarm. Under this aspect the subject
mas brought before both Houses of Parliament, in order to elicit
explanations from the Ministers who are primarily responsible for
our Indian policy. Before the attempt is made to t ~ a c ethe successive measures adopied by Lord Lytton, which have culminated
in the present disastrous results, it will be important to point out
the nature of the Ministerial explanations which have proved so
much a t variance with the real facts of the case. I t will be
advisable also to state clearly the distinctive features of the past
and present policy in reference t o the North-Western frontier of
India.
On the 9th of August, 1877, in answer to Mr. Grant DufF,
Sir Stafford Northcote spoke thus :My honourable friend, the member for the EIgin Burghs, mitb the
knowledge ho has, and the clearness with which he always speaks on
these subjects, speaks of two schools in respect to this frontier queation,
the one which is called the forward policy, and the opposite school which
i s rather for looking back, and not committing ourselves t o advancing
beyond our frontiers. Well, I have, as my honourable friend reminded us,
a1,lways leant t o the policy of the second of those schools. I have always
demurred to the idea, whicli has been put forward by some, that the best
.way t o meet danger is to advance beyond our o m frontier ; and I have
always maintained that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselvesl
are those t o strengthen ourselves within our own frontiers, and to do so
by a combination of measures moral hnd material."
((

Then, after giving a rapid sketch of the measures that commended themselves to his judgment, Sir St~ffordadded :-

" In all these views, which I have been alvays led to hold, as to the
best mode of protecting India from direct attack, I believe there is no
change whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government."
Lord Salisbury spoke to the same effect, in answer to the
Duke of Argyll, in the House of Lords. Sir Stafford Northcote,
having himself filled the office of Secretary of State for India,
must have been well aware that, for years past, there have been
two antagonistic schools of opinion, with reference to the policy to

be pursued on our North-Western frontier. H e must have had
before him the recorded views of all the eminent servants of t h e
Government on both sides of this much vexed question. He must
have studied and weighed these views, and having come t o
deliberate conclusions, he must have brought them before the
Cabinet of which he was a member, and then, as the organ of
that Cabinet in regard to the affairs of India, he must have
embodied the decision of himself and his colleagues in the various
despatches transmitted to the Viceroy. Sir Stafford Northcote,
therefore, speaks with authority upon a question with which he is
familiar, on which he has had the best opportunity of forming a
correct judgment, and in the right decision of which the most
important results to India and to England are involved. There
is no doubt also that the views he expresses have been held and
acted upon by successive Administrations, through a long series of
years, and have been recommended and enforced by all t h e
eminent Viceroys from Lord Dalhousie to Lord Northbrook.
What then is the policy which has received the sanction of so
many distinguished Statesmen, both at home and in India, which
has been acquiesced in with satisfaction by the British nation
generally, and from which Lord Lytton has been the f i s t to
depart, in obedience to instructions from the Ministry who
appointed him to the Viceroyalty? It is not, as one of its
opponents states, in an elaborate article, written in defence of
Lord Lytton, iniBlackwood's Magazine, of August 1877, j C absolute
inaction within, and indifference without, the border." It is not,
as a distinguished officer, Sir Henry Havelock, wrote in a letter
to the Daily News, "to do nothing, sit still, fold your arms, let
matters glide, and let us hope that it will all come right in t h e
end." I t is not a timid, hesitating, half-hearted policy, blind to
the march of events, ignoring possible dangers, wrapped in a
fool's paradise, without prevision of the future, or apprehension
of any change of circumstances which might necessitate rnodifications, or even an entirely new course of action. Its main
features are delineated in the f o ~ o w i n g ~ p r e g n ~ n ~ ~of~ . ~ a ~ ] : ~
)Lord Ellenborough's proclamation of lat October, 1842)-
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c( Content with the limits nature appears to have a~lsignedto its Xmpire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts t o the establishment and maintenance of general peace; to the protection of the
Sovereigns and Chiefs, its allies ; and to the prosperity and happiness of
its own faithful fiubjects. The rivers of the Puujab and Indns, and the
mountainous passes and barbarous tribes of Afghmistnn, will be placed
between the British army and an enemy approaching from the west, if,
indeed, such enemy there can be, and no longer between the army and
its supplies. The enormous expenditure required for the support of n
large force in a false military position, a t a distance from its own
frontier, and its resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the
improvenient of the country and of the people. The combined army of
England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and
in the officers by whom i t is commanded, t o any force which call be
opposed to it in Asia, will stand in unassailable strength upon its own
soil, and for ever, under the blessing of Providence, preserve t h o glorious
Empire i t has won in security and honour." .

These paragraphs sketch in broad outline the frontier policy
adopted at that date, and persevered in until Lord Lytton's
accession to the Viceroyalty. No doubt, in the thirty-six years
that have elapsed since that period, vast changes have taken
place. England and Russia have advanced to meet each othcr
across the continent of Asia with giant strides. As Sir Robert
Peel stated in the debate of June 23rd, 1842, " between civilized
nations and nations very much their inferior there is a great
tendency in the former to e x t e ~ dtheir empire in order to give
security to what they possess." ,' England on her part has added
to her dominions the country of the Amirs of Sinde, a conquest
designated by Sir Henry Pottinger a s " the most unprincipled
and disgraceful that ever stained the annals of our Empire in
India." Sir James Outram also spoke of it " as most tyrannical,
positive robbery." , Colonel Meadows Taylor writes:--"
I do not
believe that Lord Ellenborough ever desired the conquest or
annexation of Sinde ; but he was in the hands of a man who, led
on by personal ununscrupulous ambition and daring, formed, as it
appears to me, from the beginning, the resolution of displacing
the Amirs, and regarding its strategic importance of converting
Sinde into a British province." In the Contemporary Review of
November 1876, Mr. Gladstone states :-" The organization of the
Empire (Russian), efficient for many purposes, does not appear

to secure effective control from the head over the more distz~nt
members. At different periods our own Central Government
has had occasio~to feel the insufficiency of its restraining force.
A notsble example occurred in 1843, when Sinde was conquered
by Napier, under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough. That
conquest was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet
of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak, as I had just entered
it at that time. But the Ministry were powerless, inasmuch as
the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning
it, and it remains an accomplished fact." This weakness of t h e
extremities is, as Burke writes, "the eternal law of extension
and detached empire." It is scarcely needful t o point the moral
of this incident to the case of Ehiva. Russia has her Kaufmanns, as we have our Napiers.
I n 1848 we conquered the Punjab, the land of the five
rivers, with its area of 95,768 square miles, and its population
of 17,500,000 souls. I n 1856 the fertile and flourishing kingdom of Oude was brought under British sway. I n striking
contrast to these rich acquisitions of territory it is curious t'o
read Mr. Schuyler's account of the Russian possessions i n
Central Asia. He writes :L' Central Asia has no stores of wealtl~,
and no economical resoclrces;
neither by its agricultural, nor by its mineral wealth, nor by its commerce, nor by the revenue to be derived from it, can i t ever repay the
Rusfiians for what it has already cost, and for the rapidly-increasing expenditure bestowed upon it." Again-" Of the whole of Russian Central
Asia (excluding the late annexed Z<yzillcum desert), only
per c e n t .
is cultivable, which spcaks plainly as to the value of the recentlyacquired possessions." Again-" Owing to the actual insufficiency of
the local production, most of the grain for army use has to be brought
from Vierny, Kopal, and Southern Siberia."

A well-informed writer, in the Qz~arterlyRevieza, of January
1879, states :'' Russian Turkestan, notwitl~standingita great extent, is not in any
point of view, in productiveness, in trade, in populntion, or in military
power, t o be compared with one single province of' the Punjab."

In addition to the Punjab and Oude, year after year witnessed
the annexations of Sattarah, Jhansi, Nagpore, Pegu, and other
small Native 8tates. Lord Dalhousie thus announced his policy :-
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" It is my strong and deliberate opinion that, in the exerciae of a
wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to
neglect or put aside such rightful opportunities of acquiring
territory or revenue as may, from time to time, present themselves." Although there is no case so flagrant as that of the
unfortunate Amirs of Sinde, yet, meighed in the scales of
justice, some of the annexations under the rule of Lord Dalhousie
will scarcely be deemed by impartial judges to merit the designation of ('rightful." It behoves an Englishman, therefore, "to cast
out the beam out of his own eye, and then he d l see more
clearly to cast out the mote out of his brother's eye." While
England was gradually absorbing native kingdoms and principalities in the Indian peninsula, and pushing forvard her
territories to the great mountain border line beyond the Indus,
Russia was overrunning large tracts of country in Central Asia,
and subduing Mohammedan States, where tyranny and misrule
prevailed to an extent, equalled perhaps, but never surpassed, in
the history of the world.
What British heart does not throb with indignation at the
recollection of the sufferings of Stoddart and Conolly in the
dungeons of the fiendish Nasiroollah Khan, Amir of Bokhara,
who reigned from 1826 to 18(30? The common saying
was, "In Bokhara nobody knows what is to be done, to-day
you are alive, to-morrow they behead you."
One of
Nasiroollah's last acts was to order the execution' of his
wife. "The executioner tied her hands, and shot her with O,
pistol in the back ~f her head." He did not kill her at once ; she
fell, and struggled for some time. The executioner bickeJ her
twelve times on her breast and back till she died." Vambery
states l C that she was executed close to the dying M r , and
the abominable tyrant breathed his last with his g l a ~ n geye
fixed upon the gushing blood of the sister of his detested enemy."
What a picture Mr. Schuyler gives of another Ruler, Ehadayar
Khan, of Khokand :-" Under him, neither virtue nor life mas
safe." "By the wholesale butchery of 20,000 Kiptchah he
excited the hatred of his subjects."
* Schuyler, Vol. I.p. 97.

As a contrast to these Rulers, Sir Bartle Frere writes thus of
the Rajah of Sattarah :-" The late Rajah having been a liberal
and humane, a just and popular, Ruler, any supposed want of
equity in the appropriation of his dominions will lack t h e
popula~ity which a similar measure, whatever its grounds,
would always find amongst the industrious and peaceful inhabitants of a State delivered from anarchy and oppression." I n
spite of the remonstrances of Sir Bartle Frere, and of other
eminent men, Sattarah, a model of good native administration,
fell a victim to the dominant passion of annexation, which
then prevailed in Indian councils.
Not to enlarge more on this branch of the subject, sufficient
to say that, exempleng the truth of 8i.r Robert Peel's statement
thirty-six years ago, instead of the two Empires of England
and Russia being divided by half the continent of Asia,
there is now intervening between their political frontiers a
mere narrow strip of teriitory a few hundred miles across.
By the force of circumstances, as some would say, b u t r a t h e r
under the control of a Higher Power, who mysteriously works
out His own purposes known from the beginning, through t h e
instrumentality of war, and who regulates all things to subserve
one great end, step by step two mighty Christian nations seem to
be closing in upon the Nohammedan kingdoms of the world, a n d
bringing them under Christian domination.
There is no foundation for the oft-reiterated assertion t h a t t h e
various Indian Governments which preceded Lord Lytton were
blind to the results that might %ow from the gradual advance of
t h e Russians in Central Asia. I n his despatches of t h e 3 r d of
September, 1867, and of the 4th of January, 1869, L a r d
Lawrence draws the attention of the Home Government to this
question, and suggests the course to be pursued.
But the
proceedings of Russia were not viewed through an exaggerated medium; they were not regarded with a petty s e E s h
reference to British interests alone, but under the broader aspect
of the benefits that would accrue to mankind generally by t h e
substitution of a great Christian and improving Government in
lieu o f the oppression and barbarity of Mohammedan tyrants.
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I n the same spirit, Sir Herbert Edwardes wrote twenty years ago,

'' Can anyone say that to substitute Russian rule for the anarchy
and manstealing of Khiva, the dark tyranny of Bolrhara, ancl the
nomad barbarism of Khokand would be anything but a gain to
mankind 2 "
England has preceded Russia in her mission of introducing
civilization and Christianity into Asia, and, in spite of many
drawbaclrs and shortconlings, her rule has been a beneficent one,
and she has given order, and security for life and property, and
respect for law, where formerly anarchy and misrule for the most
part prevailed. Our conquests have been generally the result of
unforeseen circumstances, and frequently carried out against the
express orders of the Home authorities. There was no settled
policy of territorial aggrandizement. In the pursuit of commercial
advantages the East India Company from an insignificant factory
built up a magnificent Empire, and bequeathed it as a legacy to
the Crown. Wherein lies the great difference between the conduct
of Russia and that of our own country ? ' Even admitting that
the impelling force is stronger in Russia, including as it does the
religious element, and that the restraining force is less powerful
and persistent, from the absence of free discussion, and independence of thought and action, still, without having recourse t o the
apocryphal Will of Peter the Great, every thoughtful reader of history will recognize the same causes which underlie the advance both
of England and Russia, and in like manner forbid retrogression.
Is it then for England with her Colonies and possessions,
and vantage strongholds snatched from other nations in all quarters
of the globe, to arrogate the right to say to another great nation,
" Thus far thou shalt go, m d no further" ? Would England herself submit to such dictation ? Why should England look at these
questions only in the light of a jcalous rival of Russia, watching
each movement with jaundiced eye, putting the most unfavourable construction on every act, and thus creating a state of angry
feeling which must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to collision,
and thereby entail immeasurable evil on both countries?
In a despatch of Lord Mayo, dated June 3rd) 1870, he
C

recognizes the fact of England and Russia having "a cornmon mission in Asia, namely, the establishment of good
government and the civilization of the mighty nations committed to their care," and recommends a course of action which
Sir Henry Ramlinson pronounces to be "thoroughly unselfish,"
but " h a r d y practical." Would to heaven that British policy
with regard to this question could at all times have merited the
epithet of "thoroughly unseKsh." There is little doubt that
eminently practical results mould have followed. But then the
unselfishness must have been real, without spot or blemish, patent
to the world. There must have been no secret conventions, no
sharp practice, no attempt to over-reach other nations. Lord
Carnarvon told us recently that the old jealousies and sources of
irritation between England and America had died away; and
how has this been brought about ? "By the right intention of
each Government, and by the exercise of tact, judgment, good
feeling and sense, on the part of their representatives."
Alas ! such is not the position of England and Russia. To
the hindrance of progress, to the misfortune of mankind, to the
opprobrium of our common Christianity, these two mighty nations,
with no conflicting interests, no conceivable reason why they should
interfere with each other, have drifted into an antagonistic, attitude
fraught with the direst evils to themselves and to the world.
Let it be admitted that there are classes in all countries
which, from ignorance, inertness, or interested motives, are blind
to the tremendous consequences and calamities of war. Still, the
government of the world is not carried on by these classes.
Rulers and Statesmen, it may be charitably supposed, a,re actuated
by higher impulses, and have a deeper sense of their responsibilities. Attila, Tamerlane, Nadir Shah, and Napoleon have
~assed away, and have left the brand of infamy attached
Can it be believed
to their names in the world's annals.
that Russian Rulers and Russian Statesmen, in defiance of
all lams human and dirine, are bent on a settled and
deliberate course of territorial aggrandizement ? Is it credible
that the Czar, with whom the chief power rests in such

ing "a cornnent of good
nations corn' action which
lly unselfish,"
British policy
3 merited t h e
Le doubt t h a t
But then t h e
lemish, patent
)nventions, no
~tions. Lord
nd sources of
1 away; and
; intention of
lgment, good
ves."
Russia. T o
nkind, to t h e
ghty nations,
y they should
iistio attitude
the world.
all countries
es, are blind
r. Still, t h e
hese classes.
a;re actuated
?ir responsi)oleon have
~y attached
be believed
defiance of
ottled and
it credible
a in such

,

matters, like the Oriental Despot held up to execration in the
burning words of Burke, "resolves, in the gloomy recesses of
a mind capable of such things, to compound all the materials of
fury, havock, and desolation into one black cloud, to pour down
t h e whole of its contents" on the peaceful and fertile plains of
India ?
Russia has ample work before her for a long time to come,
t o apply a healing salve to the bleeding pores of her wide-spread
territory, to allay internal disorder, t o restore her impoverished
finances, and to consolidate her conquests in Central Asia. But, of
course, if England adopt towards her an irritating policy in
Europe and in Asia ; if so many English pens, dipped in gall,
constantly hold her up to scorn and indignation, and sow hatred
broadcast between the two nations, but one result can follow.
Years ago, Montalembert wrote :-"L'insupportable arrogance
d e la diplomatie Anglaise envers les faibles, et de la presse Anglaise
envers tout le monde, a soulev6 la juste indignation d'une foule
d'honn8tes gens." There are noble exceptions in the English
press, but their voice is drowned in the general chorus of exciting
language and indiscriminating abuse.
.,s' Granting, however, the fact, that Russia means mischief,
what course ought England to purfiueTf W e should not, I
presume, idly %nd sstopidly gazing on the menacing meteor,"
fold our arms, sit still, and let matters glide. W e should
prepare to meet the danger. W e should, in fact, have
been in a state of preparation long before the crisis. There
is not the smallest probability of Russia being able t o steal a
march upon us, so as to take us unawares./ The measures of
defence to be adopted would depend on the nature of the attack ;
the whole strength of the British Empire would be put forth to
maintain the security of our Indian dominions. There is no
difference of opinion on this vital point between the advocates of
a forward policy and the supporters of the opposite school. The
only question is as to the means by which this end is to be
sought. '
Until lately the Governmenis at home and in India have held

the opinion of Sir Robert Peel, when he stated :-" Whatever may
be the conduct of Russia, I believe that the Governments of
England and of India are sufficiently powerful to protect themselves. I do not think that we are, as a nation, dependent on the
co-operation or good faith of Russia or of any other Power." These
fern words contain the germ of a great truth, which it would be
well if England's Ministers of the present day, and England's
citizens, would take to heart. W e need no entangling alliances
with unknown future responsibilities as a bulwark to India or to
any other portion of British territory. England relies upon herself; in quietness and confidence is her strength. She seeks not
to give offence, and is not easily provoked; but, while apparently
passive, she silently concentrates her power, and is not the less
ready in a just cause, if, unhappily, such cause should arise, to
the rich inheritance
defend her rights, and to preserve ~~ilsullied
of fame and dominion transmitted to her from her forefathers. I n
the case of undoubtedly aggressive measures on the part of Russia
in regard to India, England would not; hesitate to accept the challenge ; but the main brunt of the shock of confEct mould not be
on the banks of the Indus, but in Europe ; and God forbid that
the necessity should arise for such a gigautic trial of strength
between the two nations. To avert this calamity, the greatest
wisdom, prudence, and forbearance on the part of the Statesmen and representatives of Russia. and England are imperatively
required ; and herein lies the essential distinction between the
advocates of what Sir Stafford Northcote designates " the forward
policy " and the policy pursued up to Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty
by the 13ritish Government.
I t is now. time to ask, What is this forward policy ? How
did it originate ? by mhom has it been chiefly advocated ? Let
us endeavour to trace its rise, progress, an6 development in
the recorded opinions of its chief supporters. Foremost
in the controversy we have two distinguished servants of
the Indian ~ove-ent,iSir
Henry Rawlingon and S k Bartle
Frere j Major-General Jacob, however, preceded them in the
I
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on that account best fitted to determine a great political question.
suggestions towards the permanent defence of the North-West
fkontier were submitted for the consideration of Government five
and twenty years ago. "The Queen of England formaHy to
assume the style and title of Empress of India" was one of his
recommendations, and his policy may well be called an Imperid
policy, requiring Imperial resources. He states that cc Englmd
committed a n egregious error in not driving every Russian back
to the Caucasian range," a task more easily spoken of than
accomplished. He was a strong advocate for the advance to
Quettah; and having occupied that post, and located a large force
there, he would under certain circumstances, have subsidized all
Afghanistan with money and arms. I n a previous minute he
had stated that "the afghans were utterly faithless and untrustworthy, that he never even admitted one of their nation into the
ranks of the force he commanded." Further, looking onward
t o a great European war, he would garrison 'Eer&t with
20,000 men, which would not necessarily, he stated, cause any
increase to our Indian army, or at least to its cost." I t may be
here observed that it is'a favourite argument with the advocates
of a forward policy, that our military expenses would not be
increased, as the garrisons and troops stationed in Sinde and the
Punjab might be diminished, and an improved &ontier Line
obtained with little additional outlay. The same argument was
put before the Russian Government. Mr. Schuyler tells us :-"It
was said that the diminished expenses of Orenburg and Western
Siberia would furnish s d c i e n t funds for the Government of
Central Asia, but it was found that the expenses of Orenburg
and Western Siberia had rather increased than diminished."
After specifying other details, General Jacob concludes :-" Unless
these and other subsidiary arrangements are speedily applied,
and madully carried out, our Indian Empire will be lost within
the next generation of men." I n reference to General Jacob's
recommendations, Sir .Herbert Edwardes, Bo say the least, an
equally eminent authority, wrote at the time :-"So vast a pile of
impracticable schemes seems more like some dream of conquest

than a sober system of Imperial defence. The meaning of
distances, the necessity of support, the physical dificulties of
countries, the moral dttliculties of races, past experience of
them all, the future outlay involved, and present financial
position of India, seem alike defied or ignored in such astounding
speculations."
! Sir Henry Rawlinson, a disciple of Sir John McNeill,
is the most powerful and persistent advocate of the forward
policy. His views are stated at length in his book, " Englandand Russia in the East," which he published as a sort of
manual for students of the Eastern question. It is indeed a mine
of inf'ormation on all questions connected with Central Asia and
the North-West frontier of India. ~ u t h ist written entirely from
the atandpoint of a thorough, and doubtless sincere, conviction of
Russian intrigue, perfidy, and settled purpose of territorial
aggrandizement, undertaken with the ultimate object of hostile
designs upon our Indian dominions.{ Sir Henry writes :-" I take
some credit to myself that at so early a period as 1865 I forecasted
the development of Russian power very much as it has since
occurred, and I then suggested the policy to which I now recur,
of proceeding on the approach of real danger to man the outposts
of our Indian Empire at HerAt and Candahar, in order to prevent
their falling into the hands of the enemy." "Real danger." A
great deal depends upon the interpretation put upon these words.
Lord Sandhurst, a man eminently qualified for the task as a
soldier and statesman, with large Indian and European experience,
controverted Sir Henry Rawlinson's views in an article which
appeared in the -Edinburgh Review of Suly 1875. He had
previously, as Commander-in-Chief in India, recorded his dissent
from Sir Henry Rawlinson's memorandum on the Central Asian
question, dated 20th July, 1868, which had been forwarded to
India by order of the Secretary of State. All the other members
of the Indian Government, which it may be remarked was at that
time exceptionally strong in ability and in Indian experience,
expressed, at great length, their deliberate judgment upon this
memorandum. The opinions also of officers holding high employ-
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ment on the North-West frontier were collected and sent home
with the minutes of the Government to the Duke of Argyll as
accompaniments to the Government despatch of the 4.th January,
18G9, of -which it will be sufficient to quote the two following
paragraphs :tiThe various proposals brought forward in that memorandum, in
order to counteract in some measure the advances of Russia in Central
Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in
Afghnnistizn and Persia, have received from us that careful consideration
wliich is due to the well-known career and abilities of the writer, and to
the magnitude of the events and interests of which he has treated. A
careful perusal of the memorandum forwarded to us, and a further discussion of the subject in all its bearing, has not led us to mec commend ally
substantial alteration in the course of policy to be adopted on the frontier
or beyond it. On the contrary, the closer and more constant the attention which the subject receives at our hands, the more settled is our conviction that any serious departure from the principles which we have
already exlunciated woulc! be the cause of grave political and financial
embarrassments, and would probably involve us in doubtful undertakings,the issue and duration of which no Statesman would venture to
predict."

To one who has been associated with Sir Henry Rawlinson in
public life, and who'has always entertained a high opinion of his
ability, industry, and rare knowledge on all topics connected with
the East, but has still felt it his duty t o oppose his views, it is
matter of surprise, and it may be added sorrow, to find that, in
spite of the overwhelming weight of authority which so long
resisted his forward policy, as unsound and dangerous, that policy
has at length obtained the ascendency in the Councils of the
British ~ r a ~ i r e !It is to be hoped that Sir Henry and the abler
advocates of his side of the question will be moderate in their
triumph, and give no countenance to the schemes of annexation,
and large extension of frontier, which find support in many
quarters, end which it is understood Lord Lytton favours." Sir
Henry Ramlinson has himself denounced " the iniquity of
extinguishing independent States for the mere purpose of obtaining
a convenient line of territorial demarcation." On every question
connected with Persia, Sir Henry Rawlinson speaks with high
authority ; but his suggestion, that it would be better for England
to meet Russia (coming as an invader of India) in Persia rather

1

than upon our Indian frontier, Lord Sandhurst pronounces to be
rr one of the wildest which ever crossed the imagination of a
military diplomatist labouring under a 6xed idea."
Sir Henry Rawlinson would also make the Russian advance
So long as she held aloof
to Merv a casus belli. H e writes
from Merv we should hold aloof from HerLt ; but if she deliberately
threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up."
He attaches paramount importance to Hertit, as the key to India,
and considers that an expeditionary column detached from India
to hold it need not exceed a strength of 10,000 men, 5,000 only
being allotted to the garrison of HerPt, the remainder for the
occupation of Gerishk, Furrah, Gandahar, Quettah, and Pisheen.
Lord Sandhurst considered this force too small to occupy so
many forts, and protect such a long line of operations. I n order
to subdue a single tribe of Afghans, General Wilde, an experienced frontier officer, demanded 20,000 men. I n the Umbeyla
expedition in 1863, we lost 36 British officers, and 871 British
and native soldiers killed and wounded. It should be recollected
that convoys, with supplies and munitions of war for the troops,
must constantly be passing to and fro, exposed to attacks from
hostile tribes, and that, at such a distance from our base, provision
must be made for unwonted sickness, which very often in these
countries greatly reduces the strength of regiments. Lord
Sandhurst estimated the force required at 31,000, instead of
10,000 troops, and the number deemed necessary for our present
advance into Afghanistan exceeds even this larger estimate.
Sir Henry Rawlinson, however, professed to believe that we
should be able to carry out the policy he recommended in concert
with the Afghans and with the Amir; but he was prepared for
the other alternative, as he added :Of course if the perversity of the Amir were to continue, and he
were inclined to thwa;rt the expedition, from feelings of jealousy, or from
a mistrust of our intentions, the disculties of the march would be much
increased, and our preparations would require to be made upon a larger
scale, including, perhaps, a demonstration at the mouth of the IChyber ;
but under no circumstances need the expeditionary column, as far as I can
form an opinion, exceed a strength of 10,000 men."
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With regard to the occupation of Quettah, Sir Henry
Rawlinson also assumed that we had the concurrence of the
Amir, and his language deserves to be weighed in reference to
the causes that have led to the present war :ti It is doubtful," he writes, " h o v far such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. If our positiou were already secured
vitEi Sher Ali Khan, and he could thus be led to look upon t h o Quettah
post as a support to his own power, then me should hardly be deterred
from undertaking it by mere considerations of expense; but if, as is more
probable the tribes in general regarded the erection of a fortress above
the passee as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further liostile advance,
then we should not be justified for so small an object in risking the
rupture of our friendly intercour~e.~'

This is a very significant admission in respect to one of Lord
Lytton's measures on the part of a strong advocate of the forward
policy. All Statesmen, from the time of Mountstuart Elphinstone,
have been of opinion that we should go to Afghanistan as defenders, and not as invaders. The Afghans mould receive aid against
invaders with gratitude, and if they needed aid they mould be
quick enough in asking for it ; for, as Sir Harry Lumsden mrites,
" modesty has never been an Afghan weakness ;" but whatever
Power invaded their country they would be glad to seek the
alliance of any other Power to drive them out.
"ir
Bartle Frere's ~iews*rnay be gathered from his
elaborate letter to Sir John Kaye, of June 12th, 1874,
and from an important memorandum, dated 10th November of the same year. In opposition to Sir Henry Rawlinson,
he deprecates the idea of making the advance of the Russians
to Merv a casus 6eZZi:-ccThe place is nothing to us except
as a necessary step towards Heriit and Cabul, nmd it is not a
necessary step to either." He emphatically condemns our "negative
policy," but he admits that " a defensive policy is not necessarily
inactive, nor merely stationary, still less is it necessarily weak."
This is the very point for which those who stand on the ancient
ways contend. The active measures which seem to him to be
essential are-lst, the placing of an advanced post at Quettah ;
2ndly, well-selected English agents should be stationed at HerAt,

Cabul, and Candahar, thus establishing a ~erfectintelligence department of European officers in Afghanistan. He would not
attempt the subjugation of the country nor its military occupation, nor would he hold Heriit by a force of our own troops; a t
least, not until we had tried the effect of such measures as Todd,
and Pottinger, and Rawlinson proved could be so effectual i n like
cases." These instances, adduced by Sir Bartle Frere in support
of his argument, appear to be singularly unfortunate. The ~ o l i t i cal assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger, stationed at Shikarpore, i n
Sinde, in 1838-1840, had access to all the correspondence,
official and non-official, connected with the period Todd and Pottinger were at Heriit. Pottinger's heroic conduct in saving that
city from the Persians ought to have ensured him the eternal
gratitude of the Heriit Chief and his people. But not two months
after the siege Pottinger was subjected to the grossest treatment,
insulted in the presence of the King, and ordered to leave the
Herkt territory. He was then asked to remain, but was again
insulted, his house attacked, and one of his servants seized and
publicly mutilated.
The amount of Todd's expenditure at Heriit used to startle
the officers of the Sinde Residency, for they had the means of
knowing what was going on from the Shikarpore merchants,
through whom many of the bills were cashed. Sir John Login,
who was attached to Todd's mission as surgeon, states that the
advances amounted to .S190,000 in a short period. They have
been estimated at upwards of $300,000. Yar Mahorned Khan
received $2,500 a month, and during all this time he was carrying on a treacherous correspondence with the Persian Governor of
Mushed, having for its object the expulsion of the infidel English
from Afghanistan. Just as Sultan Mahomed Khan, the
brother of Dost; Mahorned, whom we loaded with benefits,
requited us by betraying to the Sikhs our officers who
had taken refuge with him after the outbreak a t PeshaWur.
Finally, Major Todd, unable t o submit any longer to the
humiliating insults of an ungrateful miscreant (to use tilo
words of Sir John Login), withdrew the mission to Candahar.
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Under these circumstances, what Sir Bartle Frere can mean,
by afiming that the measures adopted by Todd and Pothger
proved effectual, it is difficult to understand. Sir Henry
Rawlinson was shut up in Candahar with Sir Wm. Nott's
division of the Cabul army. There is no analogy between his
position under the wing of a large military force and that of
officers stationed in isolated situations, like Herkt and BaIkh,
dependent upon their individual influence, and the prestige of
distant British power.
' This question of stationing British officers in Afghanistan may
not seem of great moment to those unacquainted with the
afghan character. The English mind can scarcely understand
the repugnance exhibited by Dost Mahomed and Sher Ali. Lord
Salisbury, having no knowledge on the subject, dismissed it in the
House of Lords with the remark, "If an ally could on such
a ground exhibit any soreness of feeling, I cannot thinlc he can
be an ally about whose temper we need trouble ourselves much."
Eyed Noor Mahomed, Prime Minister of Cabul, who was
more immediately concerned, says :-'' Grey Sahib wrote me a letter
recently, referring to my acquiescence, when at Simlah, to the
coming of British officers to Cabul. It was as much as an order
for my death."*' The atmosphere of Cabul in such matters i~very
different to that of the House of Lords, as Lord Salisbury would perceive if he were suddenly transported to the Capital of Afghanistan.
Lord Lytton also, looking at the question from a purely
English point of view, considers that " the presence and everyday acts in their midst of earnest, upright English gentlemen"
was the one thing required to cidize the Afghans. To those who
know the Afghans from the habit of daily intercourse with them,
these words of the Viceroy denote an ingenuous simplicity, and
tend to provoke an involuntary smile. " Earnest, upright
English gentlemen " would have little chance of influencing Chiefs
like Yar Mahomed Khan, unless endowed with other and rarer
qualities ; and their every-day acts " would be as distasteful to
fanatical Noollahs, Mouluvees, and Mohammedans, as the everyday acts of Afghan Chiefs and people would be distasteful to

.
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* '' Afghanistan Correspondence," p. 195.
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Eng& minds. Sir Bartle Frere says :--"Train up men like
Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Metcave ;" but such men are not as
plentiful as blackberries, even in services of which Mr. Canning
long ago said "that no monarchy in Europe had produced
within a
time so many men of the first talents in civil and
military life within the same period."
Dost Mahomed may be supposed to have known the
temper of his countrymen better than Lord Lytton, and with
all his desire to cement a friendly union with the English,
the one thing he ehrank from was a British officer, as
drg-nurse, at his Capital, Gholam Houssein Khan, whose fidelity
to British interests has never been doubted, and whose opportunities for forming a judgment must be allowed to .have been
exceptional, gave the same advice. ;8 Sir Harry Lumsden also
writes :- " Unless under the most pressing danger to Afghanistan! and at the spontaneous and urgent demand of that
Government itself, no proposition involving the deputing British
officers into the country should, for a moment, be entertained. ,,
It has been the fixed and settled opinion of the various eminent
men who have ruled India before Lord Lytton, that "one of
the best securities for success and harmony in our dealings
with the Afghans, and for the avoidance of embarrassments,
consisted in our having as few points of contact with them as
possible."
W e have in previous paragraphs passed rapidly in review some
of the main features of the recommendations and suggestions
advanced by the most eminent advocates of " the forward policy."
Following in the train of these greater luminaries are numerous
satellites of inferior brilliancy, whose schemes for the preservation
of our Indian Empire from' Russian aggression take a wideT
range, and embrace measures which would seem to require a
fathomless exchequer and a perennial supply of soldiers, which
om chimean experiences would scarcely give us wmrant to
believe that the British Islands could furnish. Many of these
writers are not satisfied wItb rectifying our frontier in India by
0btaLJng a footing in Afghanistan, and by gmrisoning Her$t,

rain up men like
:h men are not as

bich Mr. Canning
e had produced
hnts in civil and
.ave known the
rytton, and with

Y Lumsden also

various eminent

embarrassments,

,t ~ 6 t hthem as
[Y in review some

are numerous
the preservation
n take a wider
TI. t o require a
soldiers, wEch
us warrant to
Many of these

.

Candahar, BaGh, and Cab~l,but they mould
our
t o the Oxus, and some even contemplate mith comn~lnccncy
hostile
expeditions to the deserts of Central Asia. AS a specimen of
the ~ m ~ e r i scope
al
of such projects, it d l be s&cient to quote
from a recent letter, published in the Scotsman, aud ir;msferred
.t o the Morning Post, of the 1l t h October, 1878. Afteter
t o the ~ossibilityof a Russian advance "by Persia. and the
valley of the Attreck to HerAtJJ' the writer goes on :" I n the meantime, what should England be doing? Clwrying out
heartily the Anglo-Turkish Convention ; constructing s railway fronl tho
Bosphorus to Bagdad, another from the Mediterranean to join it, and
another branch to Erzeroum; making roads in all directions, both for
commercial and strategicul purposes ; encouraging, and cyt!atingif necessary, a large steam flotilla on the Tigris; pos~essingourselves, by
purchase or otherwise, of tlie Island of Karrack. With all this, preparing
by every mean8 a strong military position near Erzeroum."

I t is worthy of remark) and of serious consideration, that the
Prime Minister endorses this proposition in his speech at the
Mansion House, in which he stated that "the city of Erzeroum
mill in all probability be the scene of the strongest fortifications
in Asia Minor."
But to return to the work that the
writer of the letter in the Momzing Post cuts out for
English brains and English money :Surveying all the passes leading from Asia Minor into Persia,
aiding in every way in the regeneration of the Tu~.kisharmy by lending
British officers, &c."
gL

"If we make proper use of the time we shall have at our disposn1,Tt.e
ought to be able to collect in that country (Asia Illinor) at short notice
(shorter than Russia could collect 10V,000 men a t Herht) 60~,000menBritish, Turks, and Indians. With such a force at our disposal, we
ought to be able to hold in check the Russian army of the Caucasus, and
in addition t o form columns which could enter Persia in diiferent
directions through the Western frontier, and attack the rear as well as
t h e corrlrnunicatione of any Russian army in its advance onIndia." (This
is Sir Henry Rawlinson's idea, comme~lted on by Lord Sandhnrst.)
a Further, another force, dispatched from India to the Persian Gulf,
could operate from the South, while {ram Beloochistm a force could act
from the East-in fact, holding Asia Minor, we could absolutely p a r a l ~ z e
Per& from the West and from the East and from the South."

A.little further on, in the same letter, we find :of many eminent men, tho
Indian Government has been induced to occupy Quettall, in Beloochistan,
which position is being turned into a powerful 'place d'arnles,' in which
a British army could assemble with all the resources of England and
India at its back, and meet the advance of a Russian one."
Again :" I have now tried to point out that if we carry out the AngloTurkish Convention, and have as a condition, absolutely essential, the
alliance of Turkey, we have nothing t o fenr from Russia. But Russia
knows as well as we do the necessity of a Turlrish alliance to us, and
every effort will be made by her to provent its being realized. She holds
in her hand a fearful weapon to use in her favour-the indemnity, and it
would be worth our while to pay it ourselves sooner than lose the
alliance of Turkey ! ''
This last proposition, surely, is a climax. It is piling Pelion
on Ossa with a vengeance on the shoulders of British tax-payers.
AB we read, with bated breath, the startling list of all we ought
to undertake to preserve ourselves from the machinations of
Russia, the reflection could not but arise, Who is sufficient for
these things? But when we are told that we are to pay the
Turkish indemnity, there is a feeling of relief, because we may be
certain that even the blandest and most audacious of Chancellors
of the Exchequer, however imbued with Imperial doctrines, would
hardly venture, especially after the experiment of the Rhodope
grant, to make such a proposition to Parliament. Money, the sinews
of war, is the great want of Russia, and we ourselves are to
supply this want, and for what purpose ? to secure the alliance of
Turkey. It does aot seem at all incredible to those who have
studied the cavernous worltings of the Asiatic mind, that before
any great length of time we may be brought to loggerheads with
our fiends the Turks. Nountstuart Elphinstone, no mean
observer of the teachings of history, wrote long ago :-"I never
knew a close alliance between a civilized and an uncivilized State
that did not end in mutual hatred i n three years. Our payment
of the Turkish indemnity would be worse than our pouring thousands into the lap of P a r Mahomed W a n of Herfit, all the time
that the wily Afghan Chief was chuckling in his sleeve, and
telling the E n g of Persia, the Asylum of Islam, that " he merely
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tolerated the presence of the English Envoy from expediency, as
he (the Envoy) was by no means niggardly in the expenditure,
jewels," &c. If this sort of language is used to the TurksJ they
must indeed believe that we are in great straits for their alliance,
and that no demands which they could make would be too onerous
for us to grant. " Capital fellows these Feringhees" (the
Belooches used to say on the occasion of our fist ad~anceto
Afghanistan.) ('We sell them our camels one day, steal them
the next, and sell them again to them on the third day." All
these suggestions must appear, one would imagine, to soberminded
practical Englishmen as dreams, vague unsubstantial dreams, like
those put forward in former years, that England should go to war
with France to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice, or step
in with armed interference t o forbid her acquisition of the left
bank of the Rhine ; or, at a still later date, that Germany should
be coerced into the relinquishment of any claim she might make
to the possession of French territory. But these are not the suggestions of " anonymous paragraph miters," nor the harebrained
chatter of irresponsible frivolity ;" they are the deliberate and
matured recommendations of General Sir Henry Green, a distinguished military and political officer, who has done excellent
service on the Sinde frontier, and has always been one of the
busiest and most persistent advocates " of the forvard policy."
His letter was published in the Xcotsman, as was said, at the
request of the Duke of Sutherland, who endorsed its sentiments as
emanating from an Officer who had spent his life in India, chiefly
in Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and who mas well able to judge
of the effect of European politics on the minds of the natives of
India.
pi'
Moreover, these views are to a certain extent recognized and
sanctioned by the Prime Minister himself, as we can gather from
J
his speech at the Mansion House, and from other utterances.
They are built up on the same foundation as the secret AngloTurkish Convention, which gave us " peace with honour ;" they
are conceived in the same spirit which would fain make US believe
that Gypus was an outlying bulwark of the British Empire, and

#

a defensive post for our Indian territories. The Prime Minister
tells us that " if Asia Minor and the valley of the Eupllrates were
in the possession of a very weak, or a very powerful State, it
would be by no means impossible for an adequate army to march
through the passes of Asia Minor, and through Persia, and
absolutely threaten tlie dominions of the Queen." Here we
have the germs of the suggestions of Sir IIenry Green, o.l"ththcnew
Imperial policy, which Lord Lytton was sent out to India to
inaugurate, and which no doubt found a responsive echo in his
ardent and poetical imagination. The same master mind which
has linked free and enlightened England, teeming with life and
progress, to an effete and docaying Sovereignty, approaching the
last stage of decomposition, which has pledged British resources
t o fight the battle of the Turks, and meet a formidable adversary
on her own ground irl Asia Minor, no doubt contemplated with
satisfaction the rectification of our Indian fronticr, and the location of British troops in the midst of a hostile population, on the
confines of the Hindoo Koosh mountains, or on tlie edge of the
Turlrumnn deserts. I n this lies the grand distinction between
the old policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and
Lord Northbrook, and of the successive Ministries undcr whom
they served, and the new Imperial?policy of Lord Lytton, Lord
Salisbury, and Lord Beaconsfield. The marvel is that, with this
broad distinction existing, which must be patent to all men now
that it is revealed, Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote
should have both stated, so late as June 1877, that there wm
no change in the policy of the ~overnment."'
The first result of the new policy is an unnecessary, impolitic,
and unjust war; but before we proceed to substantiate this
charge, and to show that the measures adopted by Lord Lytton
have been the main cause of this great cclalnity, it will be
necessary to explain the state of affairs on the North-Westcm
frontier at the period of Lord Lytton's arrival in India. Onc of
the first questions Lord Lytton had to decide was connected with
the Khan of Khelat, and the tribes which owe him more or less
real allegiance. This question had been constantly before Lord
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Northbrook's Government throughout his administration, and
h a d given rise to voluminous correspondence. At length matters
h a d reached such a state that the Comtnissioner in Sinde, Sir
William Merewether, had recommended armed intervention.
T o this Lord Northbrook would not consent, but at the same
time he determined that a complete change of policy must take
place. We had hitherto endeavoured to deal with the frontier
tribes entirely through the Khan, giving them to understand
t h a t they were regarded solely as his subjects. This policy, after
long and patient trial, had failed. It was now decided to make
our own arrangements direct with the frontier tribes, or rather
t o mediate between the Ehan and the Chiefs of the tribes, thus
treating the Khan molpe as prinaus inter pares than the absolute
Ruler of the country. Before the measures requisite to inaugumte
this new policy were completed, Lord Northbrook quitted India,
and Lord Lytton succeeded him, and proceeded to carry out the
details in a digerent spirit, and with a different object. I n
order to bring out the striking contrast between the measures of
Lord Northbrook and Lord Lytton, a reference may be made to
one of Lord Lytton's speeches (commenting on Sir John Strrtchey's
financial statement of March 1877), in which he uses the
strongest condemnatory language in regard to the policy of his
predecessors in the Viceroyalty. He says :"Those neighbouring regions, after twenty-five p a r s of the closest
geographical contact between us and them, remained almost the only
ones in the whole world which are forbidden ground to British fnotsteps,
except on some mission of vengeance, and for the purpose of' burning
the homes and destroying the property of our neighbours, in retaliation
for outrages committed by them upon our own territory. Surely this is
not a etate of things which any Englishman can contemplate with
unmitigated satisfaction, or which any English States~nanmould wish to
. . I do not think that, consistently with its high duties
perpetuate.
to God and man, as the greatest civilizing Power, this Government can
watolz, coldly and immoveably, its closest neighbours floundering in
anarchy and bloodshed without extending to them, i n their hour of need,
a kindly and a helpful hand, if they seek its assistance and invoke its
guidance. Such a policy would be, in my opinion, an atheistic and
inburnan one.''

.

What the exact meaning the Viceroy intended to convey by
I

D

the use of the word atheistic " it is difficult to determine, but
the word inhuman" is easily understood. Lord Lytton had
only been a few months in India; his ~revioustraining and
experience had given him no acquaintance with Indian affdrs, or
qualified him in any way to pronounce an authoritative judgment
on a difficult administrative ~roblem,to the solution of which the
best intellects and the largest practical experience of officers of
the Indian civil and military services had been devoted since the
time when the Punjab came under British rule. Lord Lytton
had evidently not read carefully the despatches of the l3ome
Authorities, nor the reports of the officers employed on the
frontier, but formed a hasty opinion from imperfect information,
and clothed it in strong expressions. Had he studied the question
he mould have found that the orders sent out by the various
Secretaries of State, and acted upon by the Lieutenant-Governors,
and the able officers employed under them, inculcated anything
but " an atheistic and inhuman " policy. The following paragraphs from a despatch by Lord Halifkx, dated 16th January,
1864, after the Umbeyla campaign, gives in detail his views of
the policy to be pursued towards the tribes on the North-West
frontier :(f

a Our true course oi~ghtto be not to interfere with their internal
concerns, but t o cultivate friendly relations with them, and to endeavour
to convince them, by our forbearance and kindly conduct, that their
wisest plan is to be on good terms with us, in order that they may derive
those advantages from intercourse with us which are sure to follow the
interchange of commodities and mutual benefits." Again :- " Advantage
should be taken of every opportunity to conciliate the Ohiefs of these
tribes, and to create and iniprove a friendly feeling in the minds of these
here,ditary leaders, whether religious or otherwise, who in semi-barbarous
communities usually exercise so great an influence over the minds of their
followers, and whose own conduct,when not influenced by caprice, is generally determillet1by self-interest." Again :-"It is of paramount importance
that these Chiefs should be made to understand that our policy is peace,
and, while resolute to repel and chastise any aggl-ession upon our own
territories, we do not seek to extend our frontier, nor do we desire to
interfere with our neighbours."

These we believe to have been the principles which animated
and directed our officers from the earliest period after the annexation of the Punjab.
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Can any exception be taken to this policy of conciliation
mingled with firmness-the determination to uphold British
supremacy, in order to afford protection to British subjects living
i n the vicinity of the frontier, and yet at the same time to use
every effort to cultivate friendly relations with the mild and
independent tribes inhabiting the mountain ranges ? Is it just to
brand such a policy with the epithets of atheistic and inhuman?
I f rurnour is to be credited, Lord Lytton soars above details, and
he has probably, therefore, never turned his attention to the deeply
interesting and instr~ictivereports of the Punjab administration,
nor even to the published statements of the moral and material
progress of India, presented annually to Parliament.' These
statements are not exhaustive of the numerous subjects of which
they treat, and they are very unequal, depending on the industry
and ability of the officer selected to prepare them ; but they are
founded on authentic documents at the India Office, and are
generally compiled with care and judgment. An attentive perusal
of them shows a gradual improvement in our relations with the
frontier tribes, that the border has of late years become decidedly
more peaceable, axid that there are causes at work, certain, if not
interfered with, to produce, in course of time, most important
results. The establishment of hospitals and dispensaries, the
offer of waste lands on liberal terms, the interchange of friendly
visits, and, above all, the admittance into the ranks of our army,
police, and civil establishments, of large and increasing numbers of
these border tribes, are measures tending gradually to create
respect for our power, and confidence in our good feeling and
justice. The philanthropic efforts of British officers employed on
the frontier are beyond all praise ; they are known to few, but
they reflect the highest credit on the officers and on their country.
Many of them, no doubt, read with pain Lord. Lytton's hasty
and unjust remarks, betraying such a want of knowledge of the
subject, and such an absence of due appreciation of their
persevering and self-denying labours. The same precipitation
and inexperience in Asiatic modes of thought, usages, and
prejudices characterize Lord Lytton's conduct in reference to the

affars of Afghanistan, and have mainly contributed to the present
rupture with the Amir of Cabul. -'
All the proceedings, however, of Lord Lytton have met with
the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government, and both
Houses of Parliament have ratified that approval, after a very
brief time afforded them for studying the correspondence connected
with this important question. It remains to be seen whether the
people of England when they have had the opportunity of examining the whole case will confirm the verdict. Those who believe
that the new policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and
carried out in such a h a ~ t yand inconsiderate manner by Lord
Lytton, has plunged the country into an impolitic and unjust war
are bound to use their best endeavours to place the facts of the
case before their countrymen. In furtherance of the instructions
conveyed t o him by Lord Salisbury in his Despatch of the 28th
February, 1876, the first step talcen by Lord Lytton on his arrival
in India mas to send his Native ~ide-de-CampResaldar Major
Khanan Khan, with' a letter to the Amir dated 5th May, 1876,
bmely twenty-five days after his assumption of the Viceroyalty,
announcing a proposed British Mission to Cabul. Sher Ali
declined to receive this Mission ; and we learn from Lord LyttonJs
IJespatch of 10th May, 1877, that his grounds were "that he
desired no change in his relations with the British Government,
which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its
own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. If the British Government had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer
to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects
of discussion weighed by a minute and exact investigation, night
be committed to writing." / Sir William Muir has recorded his
opinion that Sher Ali's refusal was couched c c in as courteous
terms as the case admitted." But Lord Lytton to,ok offence
immediately, as if he desired to seize the first opportunity and pretext for pushing matters to extremities. I t must be borne in
mind that Sher Ali firmly believed, that under the solemn promise
of Lord Mayo, he might consider himself safe from having British
Officersforced upon him against his will, and against the wishes
of his Chief6 and people. I
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Lord Northbrook distinctly states, when Syed Noor Mahomed
objected to the step on similar grounds, that "he felt he had no
right under the assurance that had been given by Lord Mayo,
t h a t British Officers should not be sent against the opinion of the
Amir, to consider that any offence had been committed against
the British Government." Lord Lytton was of a different
opinion, and but for the interposition of the more experienced
members of his Council, he would have written to the Amir in
s u c h menacing terms that a favourable answer could hardly have
b e e n expected, and the British Government would then have
b e e n placed at the very outset in the embarrassing position either
of sitting down quietly under an open affront, or of being comp e l l e d to have recourse to measures of coercion. Eventually a
modified letter was addressed to Sher Ali, dated the 8th July,
1 8 7 6 , closing with the intimation amounting to a threat, that if
he hastily rejected the hand of friendship, the Viceroy would be
obliged to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily
isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British
Government." Lord Lytton writes at this time :-" We authorized
Dr. Bellew and others t o address the Amir and his Ministers
letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance
of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for
materially strengthening its position at home and abroad.'' TGE
a p p e a r s to have been a very unusual and illad6ed step, as it
w o u l d only tend to confuse and perplex the Amir, and to make
h i m suspicious of his Ministers. The thought would occur to
h i m that underneath dl this pressure there was same deep-laid
scheme, which threatened his own interests, and Eoded ill for
Bfghan independence. Asiatics are naturally suspicious, especially
t h e Afghans, and to negotiate successfully with them it is important
t o pursue a simple straightforward course, and to deal with the
C h i e f , and not with his subordinates. - Finally, the Amir sends
an answer submitting two alternative propositions. Lord Lytton
accepts the second, that the British Vakeel at Cabul should
proceed t o Simla, charged with a conGdentia1 explanation "of
t h e personal views and sentiments of the Amir on the subject
of his relations with the British Government."
'

The British Agent, Nawab Atta Mahomed W a n , reached
Simla on the 6th of October, 1876, and on the next day Sir
Lewis Pelly, Lieut.-Colonel 0. T. Burne, and Captain Grey had.
an interview with him. A summary of the conversation that
took place is given in the Afghanistan Papers (p. 180). Atta
Mihorned assigns eight reasons for the estrangement of the Amir.
1. The decision on the Seistan boundary.
2. Our recent proceedings in Khelat territories.
3. Our remonstrances, in 1874, on behalf of Y akoob Khan.
4. The transmission-of presents to Walrhan.
5. The results of the mission of Syed Noor Mahomed in
1873.
6. Matter contained in a recent letter from the Commissioner
of Peshawur to the British Agent at Cabul.
7. The Amir's impression that our policy is one of selfinterest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan.
8. Our refusal to sign a definite treaty of alliance in 1873.
Lord Lytton, in his letter to Lord Salisbury, of 10th May,
1877, alludes to only four of these grievances-the first, third,
fourth, and eighth,-all of which occurred before his accession to
the Viceroyalty. It is not necessary to dwell on each of these
four grievances, but it may be observed that not one of them
afforded any just ground of complaint against the British Government. h!&uchof the ill feeling, therefore, manifested by Sher Ali
must be attributed to his own morbid temperament. Sir Harry
Lumsden described him, twenty years ago, " as a man of violent
temper and cruel disposition," but " possessed of intelligence
and aptitude for business." He is prone to fits of depression,
causing, at times, the belief in his insanity. His conduct, on the
death of his favourite son, Mahommed Ali, at the battle of
Eujbaz, gave countenance to this belief. I n dealing with a man
of this disposition, a Viceroy, desirous of promoting peace, would
have been slow to take gffence, and would have exercised more
than usual forbearance. ;The decision with regard to the Seistan
boundasy in 1872, no doubt excited a deep feeling of re~entment
in the mind of Sher Ali. The objects of the British Government
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were whollf disinterested. They desired to remove a cause of
quarrel between Persia and Afghanistan, and to avert, if
possible, the chance of collision and bloodshed. No officer better
fitted to carry out their wishes could have been selected as Commissioner than Rir Frederick Goldsmid, but he was thwarted
throughout by Mirza llaasim Khan, the Persian Commissioner,
whose conduct affarded sufficient ground for breaking up the
Commission, and leaving the question for settlement at TehrAn.
This would have been the wisest plan, as, although the decision of
the British Commissioner was perfectly equitable, it gave offence
both to Persia and to Sher Ali. The less we interfere with the
internal affairs and disputes of Asiatic Rulers the better.
Lord Lytton makes no mention of the second alleged grievance-" the recent proceedings in the Khelat territories." These
included the occupation of Quettah, which the Bmir described to
the Turkish Envoy as "placing an armed man at the back door
of his house," adding, "what can be his motive, except he wants
to find his way in when you are asleep ?"* Under an article in
our treaty a i t h the Khan of Khelat, we had a perfect right to
occupy Quettah, as it is situated in Khelat territory. But Lord
Northbrook has stated that its occupation did not form part of his
contemplated arrangements for the settlement of Welat affairs.
As a significant step in the direction of Lord Lytton's rumoured
policy, combined with the threatened advance of Eashmir troops
towards Chitral, at our instigation, and the opening of new relations with the Chiefs to the north of the Oabul river, it naturally
alarmed the Amir. At this period, also, preparations were being
made on the banks of the Indus in the collection of supplies a~id
means of transport ; a bridge of boats was thrown across the river
at Eooshalgur, and the air was full of warlilce rumours. No
wonder the Amir became anxious and distrustful. Sir Henry
Rawlinson suggests that "it was the Amir's consciousness of his
*This forcible expression of the hmfr, uttered to the Turkish Envoy in the
confidence of private intercourse with cr coseligionist, is strong e~idenceof his
feelings on the subject of the ocoupation of Quetteh. It is related in 1Mr.
Grattan Geary'~Work, " Through Asiatic Turkey,"Vol. II., page 323, as comD
municated to him by a Turkish politician at Constantinople.

own disloyalty which made him regard the movement on Quettah
as a menace." But up to the time of Lord Lytton's aggressive
measures, Sher Ali had shown no symptom of disloyaltyto us. AJ
a weak State between two mighty Powers, he naturally felt suspicious both of England and of Russia. Sir William Muir, when
endeavouring to prevent the Viceroy fsom sending his menacing
letter, mrites :-ccHitherto his whole h e of conduct has exhibited an alarm and distrust of Russia, which has, up to the
present time, made him entirely dependent upon us. w h a t the
effect of the present menacing letter may be it is impossible to
foretell." Lord Northbrook and Sir Henry Norman both support
this statement.
Had we adherod to the wise policy of keeping within the
boundary line which had marked the limits of our Indian
territories for so many years, no cause of distrust could have
arisen; and, on the first serious difficulty with Russia, Sher
Bli would most probably have sought the protection of the
British Government. It would seem evident to all unprejudiced minds that, under the old aspect of affairs, Sher Ali
and the Afghans would naturally cling t o England rather than
to Russia. Since the withdrawal of our armies from Cabul, the
British Government has conferred nothing but benefits upon the
Chiefs and people of Afghanistan. Constant intercourse must have
made known generally the advantages of a British alliance, while
the contrast between an aggressive and a non-aggressi~ePower
must have tended to inspire confidence in us, and increasing
distrust of Russia. The Afghans are a manly race, and admire
manliness in others. The attachment shown by many of them
who have enlisted in our ranks to their officers is remarkable.
Personal friendships have also existed between British Officers
and Afghan Chiefs. A l l these elements of goodwill are in our
favour in compi~risonwith Russia. One deeprooted feeling, however, separates alike the Englishman and the Russian from these
Mohammedan nations-religious fanaticism, the spridgs of which
are as obscure as the effects are tremendous.'' Baron Jomini, in
arguing that he saw no reason for "mutual jealousy " between
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England and Russia, remarked " that, should the two Governments act more together, in the interests of general progress and
civilization, it might be the means of strengthening both in their
respective Eastern dominions, where a powerful antagonistic
element existed in the Mussulman population, a menace to both
Governments, and should at any time a leader of daring character
arise, much was to be feared by such an event."" There is great truth
in this observation, and Lord Lytton would do me11 to bear it in
mind in his dealings with the contingents of Native Princes to
further schemes of territorial aggrandizement. We are a handful
of foreigners rulillg over conquered millions, and it would be a
fatal error to fritter away our military strength and resources, more
especially *our European troops, in the distant regions of Afghanistan. We can never trust to India as a secure base of operations
as we would trust to England in the event of an European
emergency. In any struggle with an European Power our military strength in India must be increased rather than diminished.
It was a vain flourish of trumpets, which deceived no one
acquainted with the true state of &airs in India, to bring native
troops at a vast expense to Europe with the view of intimidating
Russia.
On the 10th of October another meeting was held with
Atta Mahomed Khan, at which the Viceroy was present. Sir
Lewis Pelly, Colonel Burne, and Captain Grey also attended. I t
will be observed that the Foreign Secretary of the Government
was absent from both of these important meetings, that is to say,
the responsible head of the office through wwhich the Viceroy's
communications with all Chiefs and Princes are invariably conducted, was not present at discussions which had an important
bearing on orders that he would eventually have to carry out. If
the Foreign Secretary was unable to attend through illness, or any
other cause, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department
could have attended. This mas done in Lord Dalhousie's time in
a similar contingency. Thus, also in regard to the affairs of
Ehelat, it will be remembered that the Viceroy deputed his own
Military Secretary to be the bearer of confidential communications

*

Central AAsia Papers," p. 45.

to the Khan, and to the British political Officer at that Court. In
the despatch of the 23rd of March, 1877, in vol. 2 ((Beloochistan
Papers," paragraph 27, it is stated that "Colonel Colley carried
out his mission with care and judgment." Admitting fully the
qualifications of Colonel Colley, it is clear that he was only one
of the officers of the Viceroy's own staff, and had no official or
responsible position connected with the Government of India,
neither had Colonel Burne as Private Secretary. The advice and
assistance of these officers in their proper sphere are calculated to
be of great value to the Viceroy, but that is not a solid ground
for dowing them to supersede the regularly-appointed officers of
the Government of India, who are the responsible advisers of the
Government, and a h o possess, what officers on the
staff
of tbe Viceroy generally do not, trained experience in the working
of our Indian Administration, and are therefore better fitted to
carry out the decisions of the Government. One of the disadvantages of this irregular proceeding was, as will be remarked in
this case, that there is no official record of inst~uctionsto Colonel
Colley, nor any formal report from him. Under the old system
of government, these irregularities would have been animadverted
upon by the Home Authorities. I n connection with this new
mode of transacting business we have, in the published
"Afghanistan Correspondence," extracts &om private notes and
memoranda put forward to establish certain important points (the
details, for instance, of what passed at the Umballa Conference)
which have been shown to have been positively incorrect. I n fact,
in one instance, a gentleman not present at an interview is
allowed, years afterwards, to put his own interpretation on what
'pafised at the time, and what was really recorded then and there
by the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department.
At the second meeting with Atta Mahorned, Lord Lytton
took occasion to explain to him, as he said subsequently,
without reserve all that he had in his mind ; he had no doubt
that the British Agent would convey this faithfully to t h e Amir."
How Lord Lytton, holding as he did in his hand the momentous
issues of peace and war,.could conceive that the use of language,
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so calculated t o provolre the bitterest feelings of hatred and
indignation tion the breast of the Amir, was becorning the dignity
of his high office, it is difficult to understand. Let us select a
fev of the cl~oiceexpressioils of this conciliatory masage to Sher
Ali:-"Our
only interest in maintaining the independence of
Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our o m frontier.
But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and
kmly-allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for
the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia,
which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the
map altogether ? If the Amir does not desire to come to a
speedy understanding with us, Russia does, and she desires it, at
his expense." "If the Amir remained our fiiend, this military
power (the British) could be spread round h m as a ring of iron,
and if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed."
" His own son is his opponent, conspiracies are rife in favour of
his sonJ the people are discontented, the treasury is empty. The
Amir's position is surrounded with difficulties. This is the man
who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia,
independent of either. His position is rather that of an earthen
pipkin between two iron pots." This latter homely illustration,
although, perhaps, Lord Lytton is not aware of it, is a term of
low abuse amongst Orientals, and conveys a gross insult. Imagine
Atta Mahorned's astonishment at such language in the mouth of
the 'viceroy.' A chord of sympathy pervades the hearts of all
Mohammedans. With many high qualities, and capacities for
rule, they are a haughty, unforgiving, fanatical race ; they
cherish the memories of their glorious Past ; and, doubtless, in his
inner mind, Atta Mahomed felt the insult offered to the Bmir,
and commented upon it, in no friendlyspirit to the British nation,
when closeted with his co-religionists.
" Is B e the Angel Gabriel come down from heaven that he
should talk to me in this manner.?" said an old Yohammedan
Chief on the banks of the Indus forty years ago, when addressed
in somewvhat similar language by a young political Agent, hose
careless words bore bitter fruit in after times of trouble. Mr. E.

Schuyler tells us "that the Russians persondy have not so much

of that contemptuous feeling which is so marked i n the dealings
of the Anglo-Saxon race with people of lower culture and civilization." The evil effects of such a pernicious example on the part
of a Viceroy are incalculable. W e read in Gibbon of the haughty
message of the Mohammedan Caliph to the Roman Emperor in
the V I I I t h century, and its barbaric grandeur strikes the imagination. " I n the name of the most merciful God, HQrGn A1
Rashed, Commander of the Faithful, to Nicephorus the Roman
dog. I have read thy letter, 0 thou Son of an unbelieving
mother. Thou shalt not hear, thou shalt behold my reply."
" Tt was written in characters of blood and fire on the plains of
Phrygia." I n the XIXth century we look for more measured
language and Christian humility fkom a Viceroy, who, Lord
Salisbury has the hardihood to tell the House of Lords, "in
caution and sound hard discretion has never been exceeded by any
Viceroy." The same Minister, when pressed home to explain his
misleading and unsatisfactory replies, says boldly, with true
Strafford ring, I n the future no answer at a l l shall be given to
questions of that kind." Let Xnglishmen who love the liberties
of their country beware of such "Grand Viziers of government by
~rerogative." On the 11th of October Lord Lytton addressed a
letter to Sher Ali, and intrusted it to Atta Mahomed Khan, who
returned to Cabul at the end of that, month. IDthis letter Lord
Lytton sent an invitation to the Amir to attend the assemblage at
Delhi on the 1st of January, 1877, for the proclamation of Her
Majesty's Imperial title. This was a mistake. I t was not likely
that the Amir, as an independent Sovereign, would be flattered by
the invitation, or would accept it, as it would place him on a level
with the feudatory Princes of India. E e returned no answer.
Lord Lytton also intimated that Sir Lewis Pelly would meet She=
Ali's Prime Minister at Peshawur, if the Amir still desired to
enter into a treaty engagement.
Various letters from Atta Mahorned, after his arrival at
Cabul, state the result of discussions by Sher Ali's Ministers on
the question of receiving British officers. c L Such an arrangement
flled them with apprehension."
Their opinion was that this
'
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request of the British Ciovernment should be declined." In the
end, however, " owing to helplessness," "though consideringthat
the residence of British officers would not at all be advantageous
t o the two Governments," the Amir consented, aIld his Prime
Minister, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, was despatched to PeshalWr,
where he arrived on tho 27th January, 1877, in very iU health.
Sir Lewis Pelly met him, and it may be remarked, without any
imputation upon that officer, who has filled many responsible
situations with credit, that his selection for this duty seems to
have been unfortunate. His Sinde antecedents were not likely t o
prepossess the Afghans in his favour, nor his previous connection
with the Persian Mission at Tehrgn. He was a well-known supporter of the aggressive policy of General Jacob and Sir Henry
Rawlinson. His name, too, had been prominently associated mith
the deposition of the Guikwar. Re mas a new man on the
Punjab frontier, having had no dealings q<th the Afghans, nor
they with him. .The Amir had been informed that he vas the
Special Envoy whom Lord Lytton had brought out mith him
from England, and intended to send to Cabul, and whose mission
the Amir had declined to receive.
The previous measures of the Viceroy were cdculilted to
darm Sher Ali, and it was very probable that he mould conned
8ir Lewis Pelly in some way with these measures. Syed Noor
Mahomed Shah had suggested the name of Colonel Pollock as
Commissioner to meet him :-'' On account of our former i~ltirnncy
they would be able, when they met, to talk over all matters
frankly and fully together." Cir Henry Rawlinson calls Eyed
Noor Mahomed the Amir's evil
and says, "he was
bitterly opposed to us." But this desire to meet an old friend is
rather proof to the contrary. The conditions sought to be imposed upon the Amir by Lord LyLytton mere, many of them,
entirely inconsistent with Sher Ali's independence. The Viceroy
certainly offered to become the jailer of Yakoob Khan, a Concession, one
imagine, scarcely in accordance with the dignity
of Her &Jajesty9sRepresentative. Even such a concession was not
likely to reconcile the Amir to proposds for the estabhhment of

telegraphic communication through his dominions, to the indiscriminate admission of Englishmen, official and non-official, into
Afghanistan, and to the location of British Agents in Herit,
Balkh, and other Afghan cities.
There were other solid advantages no doubt, if only f3hcr M i
could be brought to appreciate them, and that he would (10 so in
the end Lord Lytton, loolring at the matter from a purely English
point of view, apparently believed, as he states in his telcgraxn of
the 2nd August, 18'78:-" We believe wo could correct situation,
if allowed to treat as a question between us and the Amir, alJ.
probably could do so without recourse to force." No opportunity,
however, occurred of ascertaining whether the Amir would :LCC@
the conditions proposed by Lord Lytton, as the preliminary COIIdition on which Sir Lewis Pelly was directed to insist
a sine
pu6. non (viz., that of stationing British officers in Afghanistan)
occupied the whole time of the Conference, until the death of
Noor Mahomed Shah, which took place on the 26th March, 1877.
It is impossible to read the proceedings of' the Conference,
without perceiving that,'one single question was uppermost iu the
mind of the dying Envoy, charged as he was to convey ihc
sentiments of the Amir, and of the Afghan Chiefs and pcoplo.
" Why all this pressing," he says, " to send British officers to
Afghanistan, when you declare that you have no wish to ixlterfero
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan P It has rouscd thc suspicion
of the Amir, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts
of your Government, and he is now convinced that t o allow
British officers to reside in his country will be to ro1inquis;lri his
own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on tho
Afghan people d l be attached to his name, and he .Nil1 sooner
perish than submit to this. The British nation is grcat
powerfll, and the Afghan pcople cannot resist its power, but ttlc
people are self-willed and independent, and prim th~.ir h(nlour
above life." * What are Afghan honour and Afglrlan indcI,cndmloa
to Lord Lytton? The distant and unreal dangcr of i~ 1tuwiirn
advance on India overleaps such minor considerations. What arc
villages burned, and homes destroyed, and women and e]lildrcn
* "Afghanittan Payers," p. 195.

starved, and misery and hatred and despair sown broadcast
throughout the land, in comparison with ideal British interests
and the scientific rectification of a frontier ? Yes, the British
nation is great and powerful, as the dying Envoy said, with
marked earnestness and grarity, and the Afghan people are
weak, and Lord Lytton can break them as a reed, and trample
them under foot as an earthen pipkin, if they venture to stand in
t h e way of his Imperial policy. But God resisteth the proud ;
and this temper of mind, whether in individuals or in nations,
makes to itself great reverses.
f On the death of Syed Noor Mahomed, Lord 1,ytton lost
no time in closing the Conference, although he was aware
thai a fresh Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who, it was
reported, had authority to accept all the conditions of the British
Government. Instead of exercising forbearance, and seizing on
every opening which afforded a prospect of bringing about a
peaceful settlement, Lord Lytton seems on all occasions to have
taken the exactly opposite course,P' and to have determined to cut
the Gordian knot of di6culties with the sword. ' ~ tthis critical
juncture, when it was especially desirable that some representative
of the British Government should be near Sher Bli, to take
advantage of any propitious moment to sootlle his angry feelings,
t o allay his suspicions, and to place matters in as favourable a
light as possible, not only with the Amir, but with the Chiefs
about his Court, Lord Lytton withdrew the British Agent from
Cab~il. I t is difficult to imagine 'a more ill-advised step.' If
Russian intrigues were dreaded, this was to act preoisel~as they
would wish, a i d to throw the game entirely into their hands.
It deprived the h i r of all moral support, removed every check,
with a Chief of his moody and sullen disposition, sharpened
his sense of wrong, and gave him additional grounds for apprehension. I t discouraged the well-wishers of the British Government, and left them without a rallying point to make head
against the fanaticism of the anti-British party. They could not
trust each other, but they could trust a British Agent of rank of
their o m creed, who would report favourably on their conduct,

1

and ensure them a reward. ' It was indeed a hostile measure,
and calculated to provoke hostility. I t had the further disadvantage of leaving the British Government in ignorance of what
was going on at Cabul. Intelligence from that quarter henceforth only reached India through questionable and uncertain
channels of communication.
From March 1877 until July 1878 there appears to have
been no correspondence between the Viceroy and Sher Afi.
Then came the news of the arrival of a Russian Mission at Cabul,
"the true purpose of which," Sir Henry Rawlinson tells us,
" was to confirm Sher AliJs hostility to England, and to provoke
us to enter on an armed conflict with the Afghans, the benevolent
aim of Russia being to lead us on to exhaust our strength in
what she hoped would be an endless and profitless struggle at
Cabul." This is mere conjecture ; we know little or nothing of
the real relations between Sher Ali and the Russian Xission, one
of the mischievous consequences of the withdrawal of the British
Agent at Cabul. We know that the Russian Mission was
detained a month on some pretext before it was permitted to
proceed through Afghan territory. J The Amir declared he did
not, in the first instance, invite it. Lord Northbrook says "that
he tried to prevent its going ;" but he gave it permission to come
on when he had no alternative. Its object, he said, was only to
exchange civilities. " He had no desire to give Russia a right of
way through his country." I t was a source, no doubt, of embarrassment to him, and led to the postponement of the British
Mission, which it will be recollected he did not reject, but only
postponed. If, however, it was the " benevolent aim " of Russia
to involve us in war with the Afghans, she succeeded. One of
Napoleon's maxims in war was "never to do what the enemy
wished you to do, for this reason alone, that he desired it."
Lord Lytton seems to have acted on the contrary principle. This
Russian Mission of four or five Europeans, and a few Cossacks,
which Lord Beaconsfield admits was quite allowable, ma which
was withdrawn immediately on a representation being made at
St. Petersburgh, fills Lord Lytton with alarm, and is the basis of
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t h e violent polby subsequently pnrsued towards the Amir. He
despatches an urgent telegram, dated the 2nd of August, to the
Secretary of State, announcing "his intention to insist on
reception of suitable British Mission at Cabul, that he did not
anticipate serious resistance, that to re-establish the preponderance
of British idhence in Afghanistan was necessary for the safety of
India," that influence apparently, in the Viceroy's opinion, being
endangered by the temporary presence of a few Russian Officers
at Cabul. If such were the case the safety of India must indeed
rest on a very sandy founclation. Lord Metcalfe certainly did
say "that we were sitting on a barrel of gunpowder in India, and
never knew when it would explode ;" and again, that me should
wake up some morning, and find that we had lost India." But
Lord Metcalfe pointed to danger from within, and not from
without. I n reference to the present state of affairs, that eminent
Statesman made another striking remark. " Depend upon it," he
said, " the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves, is for
us to cross the Indus, and meddle with the countries beyond it."
Lord Lytton, ignoring alike the lessons of history and of past
experience, fixes his eyes on Russian machinations, and seems
blind to other contingencies. It is decided by the Viceroy that
Sir Neville Chamberlain shall be deputed to Cabul, as British
Envoy, and Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan is directed to proceed in advance with a letter to the Amir. On the 17th of
August, Abdulla Jan, the heir apparent, dies, and a delay occurs
before the Mission can commence its journey. Meantime Lord
Lytton telegraphs to the Commissioner of Peshawur, to inform one
of the Amir's principal officers that the Mission will, in any case,
leave Peshawur about the 16th of September ; that a refusal of
free passage and safe conduot will be considered " an act of open
hostility.'' Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan reached Cabul on the
10th of September. He was well received on the journey, and
hospitably entertained on arrival, On the 12th he had an interview with the Amir, and reported him to be very much displesed,
and as saying, " It is as if they were come by force. I do not
agree to the Mission coming in this manner. I t is as if they
E

to disgrace me. I am a friend, as before, and entertain no ill
will." If Mission advance now, c L resistance anticipated." Again,
" that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission to
clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt
to force the Mission upon him without his consent being first
granted, according to usual custom, otherwise he would resist it, as
coming in such a manner would be a slight to him."*' In a lat7er
letter, dated Cabul, 15th September, Gholam Hussein states :-" If
Mission starts on 18t11, without waiting for AmirJs permission,
there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or reconciliation."t f On the 19th of September, Sir Neville Ohamberlain
telegraphed to the Viceroy, that it was now quite evident that the
Amir was determined on asserting his claims to total independence
of action with regard to the Mission; but that he held out the
hope that hereafter he would receive it honourably. " Unless
your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a peaceful solution seems to me gone."fr' Under instructions from the Viceroy,
the Mission moved out of Peshawur to Jumrood on Che 21st of
September, and Major Cavagnari was sent forward with a small
escort in the direction of Ali Musjid, to demand a passage through
the Ehyber from the commandant of the fort, Faiz Mahomed,
who declared that) without orders from the Amir, he could not
his post, but who from. first to last,"
allow the Mission to
Major Cavagnari writes, behaved in a most courteous manner,
and very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenlrins and myself ." f
Major Cavagnari aslts, '' Shall I make another attempt to morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz M a h o ~ e dto reason, or
make him fire upon us ?" Sir Neville Charnberfkin docs not wish
to push matters to this extremity, and returns to Peshawur, and
the Nission is dissolved. He writes in his report :-" The Mission
had failed ; it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amirys
dominions with an affront delivered before all the world." The
affront was the more pointed) as two scions of the noble families
of Tonk and Jeypore accompanied the Mission. But whose cond u d led up to this affront ? Was it not that of Lord Lytton ? He
knew well beforehand that the Mission would not be allowod to
* p. 243.
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to believe, also, that if he waited a short time that consent would
be obtained.
Eugene Sohuyler says justly, with reference to the KEokhandians, w h a t applies equally t o the Afghans:-"Asiatics
do not
practise common sense, which would forbid them to begin a struggle disproportionate to their means." With the overwhelming
strengtll of British power we could have afforded to wait. I t was
as certain as anything could be that by hurrying matters we
should bring on a conflict, and that that conflict would entail the
shedding of blood-the blood of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
innocent persons, inhabiting the hills and valleys where their
forefathers had dwelt for ages in heedom, owning allegiance
neither t o the Amfr, nor to the British Government, nor to anyone except to their own Chiefs. With our improved arms of precision, our mountain guns, and formidable field artillery, our
ahnost unlimited resources in men and money, there was no doubt
that we could coerce these wild, undisciplined mountaineers. We
could cai-ry fire and sword throughout their homes ; and if we
chose, we could, as some have recommended, exterminate whole
tribes. B u t is such conduct worthy of a great Christian nation P
Will it commend itself to the millions of Asiatics over whom we
rule in I n d i a ? Will it tend to allay the feelings of dislike and
disaffection with which there is little reason to doubt, unfortunately, t h a t the larger portion of our Mohammedan subjects regard
British domination ?
T h e r e is a hJb service founded on fear, and there is a deeper
service of the heart based on justice, which all men in all
countries can reverence and appreciate. Sir Henry Xawlinson
arites :-"War
with the Afghans is to be deprecated beyond all
other wars, because, however it may end, it mill leave behind it a
heavy legacy of debt, and the hatred of a people who ought to
be' our friends." Again :- '' Our old blood feuds with the
Ghilzyes and Duranis wiU be revived and intensified, so that it '
will be next to impossible to restore that mutual confidence,
which could alone warrant our placing in the hands of the

Afghans the permanent defence of our extreme Northern
frontier." There are not only present evils, but the seeds of
future evil sown, to bring forth a plentiful harvest of trouble
hereafter. All this is done, according to the Viceroy's proclamation, in order that a the British Government may find the best
security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose
independence it seeks to confirm." I n the same strain Sir
Neville Chamberlain writes :-"The object of the Mission was to
promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to
friendly and close relations with the Amir."
Surely all this talk of peace and friendship is a strange
perversion of language taken in connection with what was
evidently to be the result of the course Lord Lytton was pursuing. But to blame Lord Lytton is not to exculpate the Amir.
Everyone can see that Sher Ali behaved like a madman, and
hurried on to his own destruction. An individual may behave
badly when a quarrel is forced upon him, but if he is not the
aggressor, allowances are made for his conduct. I n Sher Ali's
case, we have on the one side Christianity and a boasted higher
civilization, and on the other a half-civilized Ruler and a still
less civilized aggregate of ignorant and fanatical tribes, and quasi
independent Chiefs, on whose fitful support the Amir could place but
little reliance.
Bad there been no Russian Mission at Cabul,"
Sir Henry Rawlinson writes, "no indication of a desire on the
part of the Turkestan authorities to interfere in Indian politics,
we might have dowed the Amir to be sulky and grumbling, and
even insolent, for the term of his,natural life."
Here we have stated in plain and direct terms the real grounds
of our forward movement int:, Afghanistan. Sher ALi and the
Afghan nation were powerless by themselves to cause any anxiety
or alarm, unless backed by Russian troops and Russian resources.
4 Now it may be asked with confidence whether it was in tho
smallest degree probable that Russia, at the close of an exhausting
v~.arwith a comparatively feeble antagonist, where her losses in
men and officers had been so great, and her expenditure so heavy,
would have been likely to provoke EL fresh contest with one of the
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most powerful nations in the world: If the Russian Miflsion was
prepant w i t h disastrous consequences to India, as has been SO
persistently affirmed, but which remains to be proved, we had
only to demand its withdrawal, and Russia would have acquiesced,
as in fact s h e did acquiesce. W e could have then dealt with
Sher fi at our leisure. Lord Lytton's course of action had no
doubt ~omplicatedthe question, alarmed the Amir, and thrown
obstacles in t h e way of friendly negotiations. But with t h e disappearance of the Russian Mission the greatest difficulty would
have been removed. Sher Ali declared that on the departure
of the Russians h e would receive the British Mission, and he
might have been persuaded to meet the Viceroy at P e s h a m r , o r
elsevhere, w h e r e by an interchange of friendly courtesies, as at
Umballa in 1869, a better state of feeling might have been
brought about. But to effect this, the obnoxious condition of
stationing British officers in Afghan territory must have been
withdrawn. This, however, was a cardinal point in the policy of
Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton to be forced on Sher Ali at all
hazards, a n d o n the afghan people, who were more averse t o t h i s
measure than Sher Ali himself. W e find, at page 367 of M.
Ferrier's " Caravan Journeys,". a narrative of the risk he ran at
Candahar, though under the protection of Eohundil Khan, a
brother of Dost Mahomed, then Ruler of that city. T h e people
were dying of cholera. One of the Ulemas declared that "while
Candahar was sullied by the presence of an infidel, the enemy of
God and man, there would be no cessation of their afEction."
M. Ferrier's house was besieged for three days ; Kohundil Khan
himself was obliged to take refuge in the citadel until a reinforcement of troops arrived and put an end to the insurrection.
The same spirit of fanaticism still exercises unbounded sway
over the large majority of the Afghan population, and though,
under t h e coercive influence of a British force, it may be quiescent
for a time, any favourable opportunity would bring its dormant
elements into dangerous activity.
On the dissolution of Sir N e d e Chamberlain's Mission, Lord
Lytton directed the assemblage of troops, with a view t o early

ulterior operations. Shortly afterwards the answer of the Amir,
dated 6th October, to the Viceroy's letter, conveyed by Nawab
Gholam Husseia, was received. This answer of Sher Ali was
couched in a tone of indignant remonstrance, complaining of
letters transmitted to the Cabul Officials by the Commissioner of
Peshawur, ancl of the harsh and breathless haste of the proceedings of Lord Lytton, but it was neither defiant nor insulting.
The Viceroy, however, considered it as conveying a direct challenge, and would have immecliately commenced hostilities.
Lord Canning's reluctance to enter upon warlike operations
against Persia forms a marked contrast to Lord Lytton's precipitancy in hurrying on a collision with the Amir. Lord Canning
Do not be
writes to Mr. Ternon Smith, April 22nd, 1856
afraid of my being unduly hasty to punish Persia. Unless the
Shah should steam up the Hooghly with Murray swinging at his
yard arm, I hope that we shall be able to keep the peace until
your instructions arrive." Lord Lytton sent a telegram to the
Secretary of State counselling instant action, but her Majesty's
Government very properly determined to make another effort to
avert the calamities of war, and the Viceroy was directed, before
crossing the frontier into Afghanistan, to demand an apology from
Sher ALi in temperate language. Unfortunately the Ultimatum
was not drawn up in a conciliatory tone, the acceptance of a
permanent British Mission wae still insisted upon, and a very few
days were allowed for t h e - ~ m i rto make up his mind. $her fi
returned no answer to the Ultimatum w i t h the appointed time,
the 20th of November, and on the 21st of that month the
Viceroy issued his Proclamation of war.' On the same day the
British troops advanced and, as was to be expected, complete success
crowned their operations. I n spite of advantages of position, and
the great natural obstacles of the country, the Afghan undisciplined tribes have always succumbed easily to the valour and
discipline of a British force when well handled, and have never
made any determined resistance like the Goorkahs or Sikhs, or
even the Rajpoot and Mahratta armies. Many of the Afghans
are individually brave, but they have no cohesion, no trust in
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contemptible enemies when they have been met in the open plains.
The Cabul catastrophe casts a dark shadow over past campaigns in Afghanistan; our constant easy victories during years
of warfare faded out of sight, and Afghan prowess was much
exaggerated. Sir William Nott wrote :-" The Army at Candahar
has defeated the enemy in some sixteen actions, tranquillized the
whole country, made every Afghan bend the knee, never met with
a reverse, however outnumbered by the enemy."* It must be
recollected also, in Sir Wm. Nott's days, the range of the British
musket in the hands of the Sepoy was inferior to that of the
Afghan weapon (the Jezail). I t is a very different matter at the
present time, when the superiority of our arms of precision gives
us an immense advantage.
Any danger from an invasion of India by Afghans, which
has been held up by some as a reason for an advance of frontier,
may be dismissed as undeserving of serious consideration. Sir
Henry Rawlinson tells us that " Aryans, Greeks and Bcythianfi,
Turks, Persians and Afghans, have, at different periods of history,
to arrest the progress of the invader before he crossed the Indus."
Sir Henry does not add, what is an important element in the calculation, that invaders of the present day would have to meet a
very ddTerent enemy to those of former periods of history-a
well-disciplined, well-equipped British army, comp~sedof as fine
troops as any in the world, and furnished with the latest arms of
precision, and any amount of artillery and munitions of war.
These troops, led by officers of the highest professional skill and
capacity, acting under a strong united Government, abounding in
all the resources that vast wealth can provide, in complete contrast to the Governments that existed at the time of successful
invasions of India, which were, without exception, weak, corrupt,
and divided amongst themselves, with traitors in their camps and
Councils, who looked more to their own interests than to the defence

In 1868, Sir Henry Rawlillson drew " an alarming picture of
50,000 Persian Sirbaz, supported by a Russian column, and
hinted that it might be successful, owing to the prevalent disaffection of the Mohammedan population of India." I n like
manner, q~titerecently, he brings to notice the rumoured project of
the Russian Minister of War to transfer bodily across the Gaspian
to Asterabnd the army of the Caucasus for an attack on HerAt;
but in subseque~ltparagraphs he demolishes this scheme, " as all
the Volga steamers would be quite insufficient to move 70,000
men," and, " without the co-operation of Persia, which could not
be relied an, neither carriage nor provisions could be obtained for
the march through Khosasan." If these important elements for
the success of an invading army mould not be available in
Bhorasan, the want of them would be likely to to be still more
felt in Afghanistan, where, as Sir Henry Lawrence wrote in
1856, " a large army would be starved in a week."
In
reference to Sir Richard Temple's statement of Nohammedan
disaffection in India, Sir Henry Rawlinson characterizes the
1angu;lge used as " alarmist in tone, and exaggerated in subshnce." Many persons will be inclined to think that the threatened danger of 50,000 Persian Sirbaz in 1868, and of 70,000
Russians iu 1878, may well be classed in the same category.
The immeasurable superiority of the power of the British Empire,
compared with the petty disorganized kingdom of Cabul, is beyond
dispute. When the season permits of a renewal of warlike operations, if the Afghans have not previously submitted, at more or
less cost of life and money, according to circumstances, it is clear
that we can oveimn, and, if we choose, subjugate the country.
But, as the Duke of Wellington said in reference to the campaign of 1839, our (lifficulties mill commence where our military
successes end." The important question then arises, What do we
intend to do ? Has the Government any fixed policy, or is it
dlifting along, the creature of circumstances, to find itself, at no
very distant period, saddled with responsibilities political and
financial, which, at the outset, never entered into its calculation,
and which may prove disastrous to the welfare and p r o s p i t y of
((
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our h d i a n Empire ? Lord Wellesley always spoke contemptuously of the folly of occupying a land of c c rocks, sands, deserts,
ice, and snow." I s this what Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Lytton
have in contemplation ? Lord Lytton states in his isPoclamation
that "with the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Governm e n t has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved
from all responsibility from the recent acts of the Amir, and as
they have given no offence, so the British Government, w i 6 h g
t o respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere
with them." General Roberts's announcement that the districts
occupied by his troops are hsnceforth to be considered British
territory is scarcely in accordance with the Proclamation of the
Viceroy; but how far this apparent pledge of annexation commits
the Government remains to be seen. Sher Ali has fled from
Cabul, whether, like Dost Mahomed, to appear again upon the
scene, time will show. Lord Northbrook's Government tells us
in their despatch of 28th January, 1876, " there can be no question that the power of Amir Sher Ali Khan has been consolidated
throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of
D o s t Mahomed. Nowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to
m a k e head in the Amir's dominions."
I t was foreseen by those acquainted with Afghan politics that
our advance into Afghanistan would shatter the Government. Our
object was t o have a strong and f'riendly Btateriupon our NorthWestern frontier. The first result of our present policy is to veaken
and disintegrate the cohesion, which, for the last ten years, had been
assuming a more permanent form, and to let lobse the elements of
disorder, which have so generally prevailed in Afghanistan. Besides
breaking up their Government, we have made the Afghans our
enemies. As long as they believed that we had no intention of
annexing any territory beyond the passes, they would have felt more
fear of Russia than of ourselves. Our advance to Quettah alarmed
them, and our present proceedings will have confirmed them in the
view that it is our determination eventually to occupy their country.
This is not a good foundation for a safe frontier. W e desire to
raiseup a barrier against Russian intrigues. There could not have

been a better barrier than afghan jealousy of interference and
love of independence : all those feelings are now enlisted against
us, and on the side of Russia. W e may build fortlresses at great
cost, but unless we hold the country in strength, with a hostile
population, our posts would be always in danger, and useless for
the purpose for which we profess to advance them. And to what
point are we to advance ? A recent writer iq. the Quarterly Review,
evidently master of the subject, sketches out what we may have
to do :-"It
might be necessary to take up strong and commandi n g positions in front at N p e n e h , at Bamian, and on the river
of Badakshan, so as to overawe Turkestan, and compel the Russians to act on the defensive rather than the offensive."
If wecontemplate the relative distances of Mymeneh, Bamian,
and the river of Badakshan, how far removed they all are from
o w base, how great the diiliculties must be of obtaining supplies, how vast the expense of maintaining garrisons in these
remote provinces, and, after all, how inadequate such precautions
must prove to overawe Turkestan, the British Government may
well pawe before it embarks upon such a crusade. Moreover,
should these advanced posts be really threatened by Russia, reinforcements must be hurried up at all hazards, stores of all kinds,
especially mwoitions of war, must be transported at enormous cost.
Major Wood states that every round shot brought to Central Asia
by the Russians is computed to have cost nearly two pounds sterling in transport. The difficulties of obtaining carriage and supplies for the convoys, regular communication with the rear being
certain to be interrupted, would be almost insurmountable.
Those who are opposed to the present advance into afghanistan do not believe in the wisdom of a policy that would seek to
overawe Turkestan. They do not consider that Russia has either
the power or the resources to undertake so gigantic an enterprise
as a hostile invasion of I d a . Her hold on Central h i a requires
consolidation. She has overrun rapidly a vast extent of territory
sparsely inhabited, the inhabitants being chiefly nomad hordes
-poor, faaatical, as likely as not to break out into insurrection
should a favourable opportunity occur. India doee not afford us
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as secure a 'base of military operations as we could wish, t'
it is
much more secure than Turkestan to the Russians ; and all the
resources of the British Empire ark nearer and more easily available on the ba,nks of the Indus than the resources of Russia on
the banks of the Oxus. Mr. Sohuyler tells us L L that the revenues
of Central Asia are insufficient to meet the expenses of administration, more and more taxes are demanded, and since the
occupation of the country by the Bussians, the condition of the
population has not only not grown better, but on the contrary is
every day getting worse and worse."
We may put aside any prospect of present danger from Russia,
but it is said me must provide for the future. We must convert a
haphazard into a scientific frontier. Until lately this so-called
haphazard frontier was considered the best adapted for our security
by the highest military authorities. At the present moment, it is
believed that the preponderance of military authority is against
an advance of frontier, even on purely strategical grounds. Admitting, however, that there may be a question on this point, as
therc are doubtless names of great weight on either side, there
can be no question of the political and financial disadvantages
t h a t must result from a further extension of our 'Indian territories.
These disadvantages, will, of course, prove of greater or less magnitude, according to the final arrangements made by Her ~ a j e s t ~ ' s
Government for the settlement of Afghmistan. If w e .are

burden she is ill fitted to support. If, on the contrary, the easy
success which has hitherto attended our arms becomes a
snare and a delusion to lead us on to the permanent
occupation of Afghan territory, and to direct intervention in
the fathomless gulf of Afghan politics, the wisest Statesman
may be at fault in rightly estimating future difficulties.
Prominent among these difficulties is the establishment of
satisfaotory relations with the independent Afghan tribes
inhabiting the mountain ranges between our present border,
and the country owing allegiance to the Amir of Afghesistan.

These tribes have enjoyed their independence for hundreds of
years ; strong in their mountain fastnesses, inured to arms from
their youth upwards, their hand against every man, and every
man's hand against them, they cling with tenacity to their
republican institutions, and have never bowed their necks to any
settled government. They were a, thorn in the side of the Mogul
Emperors, and on several occasions inflicted eevere defeats on
armies sent against them.
I n a night attack, for which the Afghans have alwaya been
famous, the Eusofzyes killed Bir Bal, one of Akber's favourite
Generals, and destroyed many thousands of his troops. Mr.
Elphinstone writes :- " They were never more formidable than in
the reign of Aurungzebe ; they resisted repeated attacks from the
Kings of Persia and Cabul, and retain their turbulent independence
undiminished to the present day."
When Ruujeet Sing pushed
his dominions beyond the Indus, these tribes carried on an internecine war with the Sikhs, who vainly strove to coerce them, by
building forts, and punishing them with Draconian severity.
General Avitabile, Governor of Peshawur, dared not leaye his
capital, except accompanied by a large force. On the annexation
of the Punj ab the country afflicted with this chronic state of disorder passed under our rule, and ever since i t has been the endeavour of the British Government to place our relations with these
border tribes on a better footing. Progress in this work of conciliation and improvement has been necessarily slow ; the habits of
centuries are not overcome in a few years, and the administrative
exigencies of a vast Empire are so various and extensive that
attention could not be concentrated on one corner of our territories,
so as to produce very rapid effects. But all acquainted with the
subject will admit that very tangible results had been produced,
the chief difficulties had been overcome, and greater results would
have followed. Now, however, we are to commence afresh on a
new course of action, we are to take all the passes into our own
hands, and keep down by force of arms tens of thousands of those
warlike and independent mountaineers. With this object we are
to place isolated posts in exposed positions, where they will have
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enough. to do to take care of themselves, and will exercise little
no influence over the mountain fastnesses on every side of them,
from whence the predatory tribes will have the opportunity of
issuing forth to plunder convoys which must be continually passing
to and fro to supply the garrisons.
While these tribes were in front of us, we could always meet
them at an advantage, when they ventured into the pla+s. We
generally had timely notice of their approach, and could collect a
s d c i e n t force to preclude the chance of any untoward accident ;
but with an immensely extended area of operations, it will be
more d.ifficult to use the same precautions, and to provide against
all contingencies. Although they owned no allegiance to the
Amir of Cabul, and set his authority at defiance whenever i t
suited their purpose, plundering the baggage of Dost Mahomed
and Sher Ali, as they plundered the property of every one who
trespassed on their confines whenever they saw an opening, still
the rulers of Afghanistan had a .certain amount of influence,
which when exerted in favour of peace and order was not
without its value. I n rendering the Afghans hostile to us we
add another disturbing element to the task of conciliating the
tribes and pacifying the frontier, and also another element of
discontent with our rule, which may prove contagious at a
moment when we are least prepared with means of repression.
r1
l h e native army, reorganized since the mutiny, contains within
its ranks a larger proportion of Mohammedan soldiers, many of
them enlisted from the tribes on the frontier. When stationed
amongst their own native hills, and employed. to coerce their own
countrymen, the loyalty of these troops will be put to a test to
which in its full extent it has not hitherto been subjected, and
which is not without danger. Twenty years ago we passed
through a tremendous ordeal, and through God's mercy emerged
from it triumphantly. What has happened may happen again, I f
at that period large bodies of our troops had been stationed in
forts and garrisons far distant beyond the passes in Afghanistan,
it may be left to any reasonable person to determine whether our
diiliculties woula not have been greatly increased.

\

While there is danger in this respect, on the other hand service
in Afghanistan will always be unpopular with natives of Hindostan
of all castes and classes. The Sikhs and Goorkhas will view with
inveterate dislike any prolonged residence at such a distance from
their homes, which involves separation from their wives and
families, in an uncongenial climate where all the necessaries of
life are so expensive. The Goorlchas are especially sensitive in
regard to separation fiom their families. If the service in
Afghanistan is distasteful to native troops, much more so must it
prove to the numerous class of camp followers so essential in
India to the well-being and efficiency of an army in the field.
The sufferings of these poor creatures in our last advance to Cabul
and in the disastrous retreat were dre.~dful,and if rumour speaks
truly, the heaviest burden has also fallen upon them in the present
campaign.
A11 these causes of future embarrassment and difficulty
connected with an advaiice of frontier are overlooked by
many persons who have neither the time nor the opportunity
to study this important question. In the lapse of years
the lessons of the former war in Afghanistan have been
forgotten by the people of lingland, but its baneful effects have
left a deep impression on the minds of the people of
India. This impression is not likely to ba effaced, or to conduce
to their contentment, when, according to the decision of Her
Majesty's Government, they are called upon to pay additional
taxes in order to defray the expenses of the present war. At the
time Lord Canning was leaving India, Raja Dinlrur RROwrote a
memorandum for him, full of suggestive remarks, from a native
point of view, as to the policy the British Government should
pursue towards its native subjects. He says :-" To every Government the foundations of security are twofold-lst, the strength of
the army ; %nd,the contentment of its subjects. Both these are
essential. Then after enumerating the benefits conferred upon
India by British rule, he writes :-" While all these tliings tire
before the subjects in favour of a Government which does so
much for their comfort, they are still greatly dissatisfied with the
severity of some of the regulations which are against their

customs, and with various kinds of stamp duties and taxes, almost
all classes are very much bewildered from being harassed in all
the ordinary occupations of their lives. By this means the people
have forgotten the goodness of the British Government, the love
which they once entertained for it, and have begun to prefer the
tyranny of Native Princes." H e goes on to complain of the
income tax, the license tax, and the heavier salt tax, as especially
obnoxious to the people, and adding to causes of former discontent.
All those acquainted with India are aware that increased taxation
becomb more and more dangerous to the tranquillity of the
country. Several of the distinguished Statesmen who have filled
the high office of Viceroy have brought this subject, of late years,
to the notice of the Home Authorities in forcible language. Owing
to the recurrence of famines, the depreciation of silver, the general
depression of trade, and other causes, India, at thee present
moment, is less able than ever to support additiollal financial burdens, and the cost of an unnecessary war is not likely to rendcr
them more palatable to native opinion. What would entail a very
light pressure on England might prove of serious moment in India.
Lord Salisbury has himself stated:--"The difference between
England and India in matters of finance is this, that in Zngland
you can raise a large increase of taxation without in the least
degree e dangering our institutions, whereas you cannot do so in
India." 'According to a statement in Parliament by the Under
Secretary of State for India, based upon a calculation made by the
Indian Government as to what the war was likely to cost, the
expenditure to be incurred within the present financial year, which
closes on the 31st of March, 1879, was put d o m at $950,000.
And as there is an estimated surplus of ~1,550,000,the Secretary
of State adds :--"It inust be perfectly obvious that the Indian
Government could pay the whole cost of the war during the present year without adding a shilling to the taxation or the debt of
thecountry."l *,!'.&'
'
It may be observed'that the gist ok the matter is not what may
bo actually expended from the ~ r e a s u on
r ~the war up to the 31st
of Narch, but what will be the whole expenditure by the time the
I .
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war is brought to a conclusion. It is to be hoped that the sanguine expectations of the Government may be realized, but those
who recollect the expenditure incurred in the last war in Afghanistan may be permitted to express a doubt upon this vital poini.
From the published Parliamentary papers, it appeared there
were ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various treasuries
of India, when the war in 1839 began. Not only was this entirely
expended by the end of the year 1841, but a loan of five millions
bad to be raised at an unusually high rate of interest. Sir Robert
Peel stated in Parliament, on the 23rd June, 1842, that there had
been a surplus revenue, just before the commencement of the war,
of a million and a half, which, in 1840-41, was converted into a
deficit of $2,324,000. I n his letter to Lord Aberdeen, of September 1841, Sir Henry Willock stated that so severely were the
finances of Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of payment at Fort
William was at one time contemplated by the Supreme Council.
On the 6th April, 1842, the Court of Directors brought to
the notice of the President of the Board of Control, that the
Government of India had intimated their intention " to discontinue their remittances for the supply of the Home Treasury, by
means of advances upon goods hypothecated to the Court. The
Local Government have been compelled to adopt this course by
their financial difficulties, whicll have been wholly caused by the
expensive operations in which they have been engaged beyond the
Indus."
The total military expenditure of India, during the five years
ending with 1837-38, amounted to a little more than thirty-eight
millions sterling; in the following five years it exceeded fortyeight millions. It was affirmed, on good authority, tliat nearly a
million sterling a a s expended on camels alone-70,000 of these
animals were reported to have perished during the campaign.
The loss of horses also waa very p a t . Major Eough statcs that
in one day it was requi~iteto shoot fifty-three horses. Want ol
forage for the cattlc, and want of provisions for thc troops and
followers, c h ~ r a c t d z c dthe former advancc into Afgl~anistan. It
is well lraown that in many parts of tho country the population
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itself is constantly in a state of semi-starvation. There is no
reason to believe that the productiveness of Afghanistan has
increased of late years, but, on the contrary, that it has diminished.
What must, therefore, be the difficulty and expense of procuring
supplies for men and cattle during a long campaign? British
energy, and a lavish expencliture of money mill, no doubt, overcome these difficulties; but all this mill contribute to swell the cost
of the war, and lead to further embarrassments.
Sir James Outram writes, in his rough notes, on 29th April,
1839 :-" The army is in great distress for want of yrovisions, six
days' supplies only remain in the Commissariat stores, and
the merchants of Oandahar, who profess t o have nothing in
reserve, retail wheat flour in small quantities, at the rate of two
seers (4 lbs.) the rupee, everything else being proportionately dear."
Again :-" Provisions are daily becoming scarcer, and more dear,
and flour has actually attained the exorbitant rate of a single seer
for the rupee, a price which is, of course, quite beyond the
means of our impoverished follomers. No grain has as yet been
obtained for the horses." " The effects of the unwholesome food
mhich the wretched followers have been obliged to consume, is
everywhere painfully manifest."
He had previously Faitten :--"The followers of the army
were compelled to elie out their subsistence by picking up
weeds."
Subsequently the followers received their rations from
the Commissariat in the same manner.as the native troops, a very
merciful measure; but the enormous expense entailed upon the
Government by such a concession, with provisions at famine prices,
may well be imagined. The effect of the exorbitant price of food
of all descriptions, and the consequent increased scarcity, must
have been to inflict great hardship and suffering on the poorer
classes of the population of the country, and on classes with fixed
stipends; and Sir William Macnaghten states that this mas one of
the causes of British unpopularity. In the present campaign it
is believed that the native troops who have crossed the frontier
receive rations from the Commissariat, as in the previous war.
When it is>;recollected that the number of troops in the three
F

armies now employed exceeds those sent forward on the former
invasion of Afghanistan, some idea may be formed of the expenditure lilcely to be incurred. I n order to reduce this expenditure to
the lowest point, Lord Lytton has not shrunk from the risk of
denuding India of its garrisons, resorting to the questionable
expedient of being indebted to Native Princes for contingents of
troops to fill their places. Lord Dalhousie, in his minute of 28th
February, 11856, observed :--"No prudent man who has any knowledge of Eastern affairs, would ever venture to predict the maintenance of continued peace within our Eastern possessions.
Experience-frequent, hard, and recent experience-has taught us
that war from without, or rebellion from within, may at any time
be raised against us, in quarters where they were the least to be
expected, and by the most feeblc and unlikely instruments.''
As far as can be ascertained, me have now seventeen regiments
of British cavalry and infantry, and thirty-eight regiments of
native cavalry and infantry, and about twenty-five batteries of
artillery employed in Afghanistan, or on the very confines of our
North-West 'ontier, in support of the troops in advance. I n order
to replace this large portion of the garrison of India, two
regiments of British infantry, which were to have come homo,
have been detained, and fifteen thousand recruits have been added
to the native army. If trouble ~houldarise in the interior, or at
the other extremity of our dominions, the Government might find
itself' in a dilemma to provide troops to meet the emergem!-. By
the proposed advance of frontier, we muItiply greatly the chances
of collision both from within and from without, and impose upon
India the absolute necessity of paying for a larger proportion of
European troops, as any fmce stationed in Afghanistan must be
chiefly composed of British regiments. On a very moderate
estimate, even the occupation of posts above the passes would
entail an additional burden on the revenues of India of more
than ,z million sterling n year ; and, in the event of a further
advance, which would most probably occur, enhanced expenditure would of course follow. The want of mean? has been the
real reason why important works connected with the strengthen-
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ing of our North-Western frontier, which have been for a series of
years recommended by the highest military authorities, have not
been executed. The completion of our railway communication to
Peshawur, the construction of bridges across the Indus, the
erection of fortitications in suitable positions, have all been constantly before the Government, and only delayed from financial
considerations. These works relate only to the frontier ; but how
many undertakings of the highest utility throughout India are
obliged to be indefinitely postponed from the same cause? Already,
at the very outset of the present war, the local Governments have
been compelled to issue resolutions suspending the execution of
all public works and grants of money until the state of the
finances will permit of sanction being accorded. To use the words of Lord Sandh~~rst,
" it cannot be too often
repeated that the occupation of Afghanistan, on account of the
financial difficulty, is the stoppage of progress in India." Her
Majesty's Government, it is but fair to conclude, h a ~ ean equal
interest with previous Go~ernmentsin the welfare and prosperity
of India, and in undertaking the grave responsibility of an advance
into Afghanistan, they must believe that such a step is imperatively necessary for the safety of our Xastern dominions. But they
cannot be blind to the impoverished state of India, nor to the
political risks to be incurred by any attempt to impose additional .
taxation. They must therefore desire, as much as the strongest
opponents of their present policy, to reduce to a minimum the
burden about to be thrown on the Indian finances. It is clear
that, however costly the expenditure incurred in the advance into
Afghanistan, the permanent occupation of the country wiU entail
a far heavier pressure upon the revenues of India ; those revenues,
according to Sir John Strachey, possessing "no true surplus over
expenditure to cover the many contingencies to which a great
country is exposed." What, then, is the course to be pursued ?
What is the solution of the present difEcult conjuncture of affairs,
which is likely to be attended with the fewest political responsibilities, and the smallest probable future expenditure ?
It must be admitted that the di5culties to be surmounted are

very great, and depend to a certain extent upon contingencies not
to be foreseen. The beginning of strife is as when one letteth
out water, the end is often beyond our own control. The first
thing to be achieved is to bring the war to an honourable conclusion. The brilliant success that has attended the operations
already undertaken bear ample witness to the gallantry and
endurance of our troops, and to the promptitude, skill, and judgment of the generals in command. Whatever our armies may he
called upon to perform, it is quite certain they will do their duty
with the same valour and efficiency which they have always
shown in all previous campaigns in every quarter of the globe.
Peace, therefore, will be secured, either by an early submission of
the Afghan leaders, or, after a short delay, as soon as the season
permits of warlike movements. Hostilities being ended, and our
power vindicated, the grand feature of our policy should be
moderation in our demands.
Lord Lytton has proclaimed to the world that "with the
Sirdars and people of Afghanistan the British Government has
no quarrel, and desires none; " and that "it will respect their
independence." Let us act up to this declaration by insisting
upon nothing that will wound the national feeling, and thus tend
to keep alive a spirit of bitterness, and sow the seeds of future
dissension. Meanwhile, now is the time to place our relations
with Russia, in regard to these countries, upon a permanent and
definite footing. We have hitherto never gone to the root of this
great question with Russia, we have dealt with things on the
surface in a vague undecided manner. Mr. Schuyler, who, it
may be observed, is perhaps not wholly impartial, but whose
opinion nevertheless carries weight, writes :-"The
attitude of
England towards Russia, with regard to Central Asia, can hardly
be called a dignified one. There are constant questions, protests,
demands for explanation, and even threats, at least in the
newspapers, but nothing is ever done." Subsequently to the
understanding entered into at the period of Mr. GladstoneYs
administration, ltussia certainly endeavoured to fasten upon
England the responsibility of controlling Sher Ali, but this was
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repudiated by Mr. Gladstone i n his important speech of
2Srd April, 1873. ltussia then let it be understood that, if
England had preserved her freedom of action, Russia had done
the same. Agab, Mr. Schuyler writes, evidently speaking from
a Russian point of view :-" unless some new arrangement
should be made, Russia has a perfect right, i n case of troubles on
the Oxus, to cross it and inflict punishment on t ~ troops
e
and
provinces of Sher Ali." A new arrallgement should undoubtedly
b e made between the two Governments, not a mere understanding,
but a binding engagement. I n order, however, that negotiations
should. have the best prospect of a happy termination, England
should bear in mind the advice of a friendly French Minister
(quoted by Sir Charles Dilke in a recent speech):-" It is of the
most essential importance that the English Government should
avoid, both in attitude and in language, everything in the least
like arrogance." We should approach the discussion of this
important question in no spirit of dictation nor of jealous rivalry,
but on the footing of the perfect equality which belongs to inyo
of the greatest nations in the world. W e require nothing more
&om Russia than that she should enter into permanent and
definite engagements, in accordance with her former assurances,
with regard to Afghanistan, we on our part binding ourselves
to respect the integrity and independence of the Afghan kingdom,
and to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Central
Asia beyond the Oxus. W e should also undertake to exercise
our iofiuence to prevent the Ruler of Afghanistan from giving
offence to Russia, or embroiling himself with his neighbours, and
we should seek no commercial advantages to the prejudice of
Russia. It is so much to the interest of both co1.1atries that such
an engagement should exist that it is difficult to imagine that
any serious obstacle could arise to prevent its conclusion.
We proceed, then, to deal with ~ f ~ h a n i s t a nWeighty
arguments have been put forward by the highest
authorities against any advance of frontier in that
General Sir Henry Norman, himself a high authority, writes in a
recent number of the Fortnightly Review :-" While many o ~ ~ ~ i ~ m
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have been given as to the folly of advancing our frontier, it
seems an undoubted fact that no opposite opinion ever was
expressed by any of the able Governors-General who have held
sway in India up to the arrival of Lord Lytton, by any Commander-in-Chief in India, by any Lieutenant-Governor of the
Punjab, the o5cer through whom, until 1876, all Cabul affairs
used to be transacted, or by any member of the Supreme Council,
before which all important questions affecting the Indian Empire
come. 'Many officers in these positions have left on record the
strongest possible objections to a forward movement except as an
operation of war." I n reference to the occupation of any post
beyond the Ehyber, General Hamley writes :--" There is much
to be said against it, nothing for it. I t would be a source not of
strength but of wealmess." H e then goes on to say on the
question of meeting danger from invasion :-" I should feel confident of the result even in the Valley of the Indus, I think our
position vastly improved by the occupation of Quettah, but I
should think it all we could desire if we occupied Candahar."
There is no doubt that Candahar, converted into a strong fortress,
and held by an adequate garrison of British troops, would prove
a formidable obstacle to an invading army. Its situation in the
most fertile portion of Afghanistan, commanding the three roads
to India, offers great advantages in a purely military point of
view. But cogent political and financial reasons forbid the
extension of our frontier, and enjoin the preservation, if possible,
of an independent Afghan Kingdom intermediately between our
own boundary and that of the Russian possessions in Central
Asia. It is a subject of regret that we advanced to Quettah,
more particularly without the consent of the Amir, who, if
properly approached in the first instance might have acceded to
our wishes ; but having done so, and having, under treaty with the
Khan of Ehelat, an undeniable right to locate troops in his
territories, it may not be advisable that we should withdraw from
a position of strategical importance, both with reference to the
control of the Afghans and Belooches and to ulterior contingencies. Whether the town of Quettah itself in respect to salubrity
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and other considerations fulfils all the conditions needed to render
it the most eligible position we could occupy can only be determined by competent professional advisers on the spot. If not,
there could doubtless be found in its vicinity some other locality
where a large entrenched camp could be formed, which, held in
strength, would secure all the required objects defensive and
offensive. Our first duty should be to complete the communications with our base, including the railroad to Dadur, and a bridge
across the Indus at Sukkur, with posts in support of adequate
strength along the line to the rear.
~ h e s eworks, essential on military grounds, would be highly
beneficial also commercially. Our domination of the Bolan and
the other passes near at hand, and our necessarily more intimate
connection with the countries beyond, by rendering traffic more
secure, and by guaranteeing freedom from vexatious imposts and
restrictions, would give a great impulse to trade. Amongst
the measures to be taken on the cessation of hostilities, and the
renewal of relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, there should
be an arrangement for placing British commercial interests on a
proper footing, and for protecting them against any hostile tariffs
or immoderate transit duties. In the absence of official information it is difficult to determine how far the Government is
committed to annexation by the reported announcement of Gencrd
Roberts that the inhabitants of the Khost and Ehurum Valleys
were henceforward to consider themselces British subjects. These
raids upon outlying districts of the Amir's kingdom, which have
been the cause of an immense amount of human suffering,
without exercising any perceptible influence on the main purpose of
the war, are to be lamented. The annexation of this territory,
which is not likely to produce sufficient revenue to pay the cost of
administration, and is certain to require additional troops to protect
that portion of the population which is peacefully disposed, mould
prove a source of future trouble and increased expen&ture. It
would be well that the British garrisons should be mithdram
mthin the
border-line of British tcrritorg. on the riglrt
bank of the Indus. I n fact, me should eschew all annexation of

Afghan territory. Our object should be to conclude a treaty with
whatever Ruler the Afghan nation may select, without interference
with the integrity of their dominions or with their independence.
W e should beware of setting up a nominee of our own, but leave
the choice to the Afghans themselves. I n order to afford them a
convincing proof of our desire to maintain their independence, we
should make the concession to their prejudices of withdrawing
our demand for the residence of British Officers at Cabul, and in
other Afghan cities. W e should be content with a Mohammedan
Envoy of rank and influence at Cabul. His salary should be
increased and his establishment placed on a much more liberal
scale than has hitherto been the practice. Selected Native Agents
of intelligence might also be stationed at Her&$ Balkh, or in any
other Afghan towns which might appear desirable.
J'It was a cardinal maxim of the policy of the Nepaul Govern/'
ment for many years to keep the secrets of their own fastnesses
unspied into by us, and a great jealousy of Europeans still exists
in that country; in Burmah, also, and even in Eashmir, there is
an undercurrent of dislike to the presence of British o5cers. W h y
should we then insist on the compliance of the Afghans with a
condition which it is clear is so repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of the Chiefs and people? The time may come, and in the
interests of humanity and civilization all will desire to hasten it,
when the Afghans themselves may be willing to waive the objection on which they have hitherto so strongly insisted, and when
this wild fanatical people will be brought under the ameliorating
influences which British rule exercises on the population of India.
Much has been done within the last half-century, but there is still
sufficient work to tax to the utmost British energies, and to satisfy
British ambition, without adding more territory to our already
overgrown Eastern Empire. It remains to recapitulate the points
which it has been sought t o establish in the foregoing pages.
1st. That the settled policy of former Administrations, composed of both parties in the State, in regard to the defence of the
North- Western fronticr of India, has been, without sufficient
cause, departed from by Lord Lytton, acting under instructions of
the present_Ministry.
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2nd. That the danger apprehended horn Russian aggression
has been greatly exaggerated, and that the measures adopted in
consequence are calculated to prejudice the best interests of our
Indian Empire.
3rd. That the hasty, inconsiderate action of Lord Lytton precipitated hostilities, and led to an unnecessary, impolitic, and
unjust war.
4th. That any annexation of Afghan territory mould increase
our political and financial difficulties, and entail a grievous burden
OR the revenues of India.
5th. That an attempt to secure more effectual hold on the
passes lying between our border line and afghanistan, and to
coerce the mountain tribes by placing military posts in their fastnesses, would fail in its object, except at a cost too burthensome to
be sustained.
6th. That the expenses of the present mar will far exceed the
estimate of the Government, and that in the impoverished state
of India, increased taxation may be attended with most serious
results.
The essential condition of progress and improvement in
India is the continuance of peace. However erroneous the policy
enjoined by Lord Salisbwry, it is ~ossiblethat more temper,
prudence, and forbearance, on the part of Lord L~.tton, might
have averted its worst consequences. I n Lord Lytton's hanh it
culminated in war, and it contains the germs of future marsMr. GFladstone wrote of our Indian Empire, in a recent number of
Review
This astonishing fabric was in the
the Contem~orar~
main built up by a mercantile Company, with secondary aid from
the counsels and control of the Government, and under the
guidance of the practical good sense which is so remarkable in
our countrymen, except when some peculiar Ate' bewilders and
misleads them."
again :-" The Company delivered India
fiom the flighty genius of Lord Ellenborough, who leant to the
ostentatious policy that has lately received, upon more dangerous
ground, a more serious development. The toleration they established was one only too wide. They boldly gave education to the
:-'(
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people. They established a Free Press half a century ago. They
laid the foundation of the railway system. They discouraged t o
the best of their ability aggression on the Native Princes and on
neighbouring territories. Their policy was, in the best sense,
Conservative, and at the time when they handed over their high
office to the Ciovernment, there was not a point, in the whole of
our case with India, at which we could say they had neglected
duty or precaution, or had either feigned or courted dangers."
The East India Company may well be proud of this meed of
g
praise from England's greatest and noblest l i ~ Btatesman.
Its calm, equable, sagacious, administration typified admirably
English sobriety, moderation, and practical good sense. The
names of its illustrious servants are enshrined in the foremost
roll of English Worthies. Nr. Gladstone's allusion to the "flighty
genius of Lord Ellenborough" suggests an apt ~ a r a l l eto
l the distinguishing feature of the intellectual constitution of the present
Viceroy. I n a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated 21st
January, 1844, conceived in the same spirit of pride and self-sufficiency which dictated Lord Lytton's haughty message to the b i r
of Cabul, Lord Ellenborough, wrote of the Court of the Directors
of the East India Company :-"I am satisfied. that if they were
left to themselves they would lose the country in three months."
I n little more than three months the Court of Directors, in the
interests of the good Government of India intrusted to their
keeping by the nation, took upon themselves the grave responsibility of recalling Lord Ellenborongh fiom his high office. Parliament and the people of England ratified the act. I t may be
confidently affirmed that, under the East India Company's direction of Indian affairs, where party prejudices and psepossessions
never intruded, Lord Lytton's impulsive action, disregard of established forms of procedure, and tendency to personal Government,
would not have been lightly passed over. I n the fulness of time
it is believed that the practical good sense of the English nation
will pronounce a just judgment on this second Afghan War, and
on the merits of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration.
*page 419 of Lord Colchester'e " Indian Administrations of Lord Ellenborough."
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